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I. TERMINOLOGY
In the field of felony the common law divided guilty parties into
principals and accessories.1 According to the ancient analysis only the
actual perpetrator of the felonious deed was a principal. Other guilty
parties were called "accessories", and to distinguish among these with
reference to time and place they were divided into three classes: (I)
accessories before the fact, (2) accessories at the fact,2 and (3) acces-
sories after the fact. At a relatively early time the party who was
originally considered an accessory at the fact, ceased to be classed in the
accessorial group and was labeled a principal. To distinguish him from
the actual perpetrator of the crime he was called a principal in the
second degree. 3 Thereafter, in felony cases there were two kinds of
principals, first degree and second degree, and two kinds of accessories,
before the fact and after the fact. As applied to homicide cases, the
common law of parties was summarized in this form by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina:
"The parties to a homicide are: (I) principals in the first
degree, being those whose unlawful acts or omissions cause the
death of the victim, without the intervention of any responsible
agent; (2) principals in the second degree, being those who are
actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime, aiding
and abetting therein, but not directly causing the death; (3) acces-
sories before the fact, being those who have conspired with the
actual perpetrator to commit the homicide, or some other unlawful
act that would naturally result in a homicide, or who have pro-
cured, instigated, encouraged, or advised him to commit it, but
who were neither actually nor constructively present when it was
committed; and (4) accessories after the fact, being those who,
t-A.B., I9IO, University of Kansas; J.D., 1912, Stanford University; S.J.D.,
191i6, Harvard University; Professor of Law, State University of Iowa; author, Iowa
Criminal Justice (1932), Cases on Criminal Procedure (3d ed. 1929); member, Iowa
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i. "Etymologically the noun, or substantive, is primarily accessary and the adjec-
tive accessory; but present usage favors accessory for both." WEBSTER'S NEW INT.
DIcTIONARY (1934).
'2. I HALE P. C. *437; 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
(1883) 230; Matters of the Crown Happening at Salop, i Plo. 97, 99 n., 75 Eng. Rep.
R. 152, 157 (553); United States v. Hartwell, 26 Fed. Cas. 196, No. 15,318 (C. C.
Mass. 1869) ; State v. Scott, 8o Conn. 317, 323, 68 Atl. 258 (1907). Sometimes by
statute, the phrase "accessory during the fact" is used to include the accessory before
the fact and the ancient accessory at the fact, with the provision that he shall be tried
and punished as a principal. See 2 CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 193o) § 1749.
3. Ibid.
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after the commission of the homicide, knowingly aid the escape of
a party thereto." 4
Since accessories are recognized only in felony cases, one who
occupies a certain relati6n to a crime may be either an accessory or a
principal depending upon whether the offense is a felony or not. In
fact, as will be pointed out presently, one may occupy such a position
that he is (i) a principal if the offense is treason, (2) an accessory
after the fact if the offense is a felony, or (3) neither if the offense is
a misdemeanor. To describe parties occupying various positions in
relation to the crime, there should be appropriate words which would
be the same no mattr what the crime may be. Both "principal" and
"caccessory" are unavailable for this purpose and hence other terms
must be employed.
The starting point in a classification of parties in the field of
criminal law is the distinction between innocent and culpable 5 parties.
One who has caused, or has aided in causing, a socially harmful occur-
rence, or has interfered with the course of justice after such occurrence
may, under certain circumstances, be excused by the law, for the part
he has played. The most common excuse recognized by the law is the
innocent mistake of fact, a mistake of fact based upon reasonable
grounds, of such a nature that what was done would not have been
socially harmful (or if so would have been privileged) had the facts
been as they were bona fide believed to be. The classic example is the
fatal act of a daughter in placing in her father's beverage a powder she
believed to be a beneficial medicine, but which was in fact a deadly
poison.6 Excuses are also recognized where the socially harmful occur-
rence is caused by one too young or too insane to have criminal capac-
ity.7  Other excuses might be mentioned, such as acts done under
necessity 8 or compulsion, although the latter have rather limited appli-
cation.9 If the only person connected with a socially harmful occur-
4. State v. Powell, 168 N. C. 134, 138, 83 S. E. 310 (1914).
5. The word "culpable" is used here rather than "guilty," because, although the
two are nearly synonymous, it is believed the person who assists a misdemeanant to
avoid arrest or conviction, may be classed as a "culpable" party, although such conduct
does not render him guilty of the misdemeanor.
6. Memo. Kel. J. 53, 84 Eng. Rep. R. 1079 (1708).
7. See, e. g., Regina v. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 643 (1838);
Johnson v. State, 192 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182, 2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 879 (1904).
8. Necessity, as an excuse in the homicide cases, finds its chief recognition in the
law of self-defense, and one cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a homicide if
the perpetrator was excused or justified in the killing. Harper v. State, 83 Minn. 402,
35 So. 572 (9o3) ; Patton v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 71, 136 S. W. 459 (I91I). See also
Hurd v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 315, 78 S. W. (2d) 9 (1935).
9. The common law does not recognize any compulsion as sufficient to excuse the
intentional killing of an innocent person. Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S. W. 773
(1904). But one who is compelled under threat of death to go with wrongdoers, and
who did not himself cause the loss of life, may have an excuse for a homicide caused
by one of the group. Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, 126 Pa. 54, 17 Atl. 52o (I88g)
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rence is an innocent party, or if there are several parties all within this
group, no crime has been committed. On the other hand, if a culpable
party makes use of an innocent agent in the perpetration of his criminal
plan, it is the same, in the words of East, as if he had used "merely an
instrument." 1o
Culpable parties are of four different kinds, who may be called
respectively: (i) perpetrators, (2) abettors, (3) inciters, and (4)
criminal protectors. A "perpetrator", as here used, is one who, with
men rea,11 has caused a socially harmful occurrence either with his own
hands, or by means of some tool or instrument or other non-human
agency, or by means of an innocent agent. Nothing novel is involved in
this suggestion, because the word has been employed with this meaning
at least since the time of Blackstone.1
2
An "abettor", as here used, is one who is present, either actually or
constructively, and who, with mew rea,18 either assists the perpetrator
in the commission of the crime, stands by with intent (known to the
perpetrator) 14 to render aid if needed, or commands, counsels or other-
wise encourages the perpetrator to commit the crime. The limitation
of the word "abettor" to one who was present at the time, either actually
or constructively, is the preferred usage, 15 although the term has occa-
IO. I EAST P. C. *228. Where a crime is accomplished through the instrumentali-
ity of an innocent agent, the one who induced the act is a principal even though not
present when the act was committed. Aldrich v. People, 224 Ill. 622, 79 N. E. 964
(1907).
ii. That is, one who has acted with malice aforethought or with criminal negli-
gence in a homicide case, with animus furandi in a larceny case, with intent to commit
a felony in a burglary case or, in other words, with whatever kind of mind at fault is
required in order that the particular socially harmful occurrence may be classified as a
crime.
12. 4 BL. CoMM. *34. See also Smith v. State, 37 Ark. 274, 276 (188i); In re
Vann, 136 Fla. 113, 118, 186 So. 424, 426 (1939) ; People v. Whitmer, 369 Ill. 317, 320,
6 N. E. (2d) 757, 759 (1938) ; State v. Wilson, 39 N. M. 284, 289, 46 P. (2d) 57, 60
(1935) ; Commonwealth v. Bitler, 133 Pa. Super. 268, 281, 2 A. (2d) 493, 498 (1938);
Moore v. Lowe, i16 W. Va. I65, i8o S. E. i (1935); Krudwig v. Koepke, 223 Wis.
24 249, 27o N. W. 79, 81 (936). One court has spoken of an offender who commits
his offense by the aid of an innocent agent as "not the actual perpetrator." People v.
Whitmer, 369 IIl. 317, 320, 16 N. E. (2d) 757, 759 (1938). But if emphasis is placed
on the crime rather than the mere physical occurrence it seems proper to say that one
who has contrived to bring about the prohibited result by the employment of innocent
hands, has perpetrated his offense in this manner.
13. ". . . the word 'abet' includes the elements of knowledge of the wrongful
purpose of the perpetrator and counsel and encouragement in the illegal act." Ander-
son v. Board of Medical Examiners, i7 Cal. App. 113, 114, 3 P. (2d) 344 (1931) ; ef.
State v. Ankrom, 86 W. Va. 570, 574, 103 S. E. 925 (920).
14. State v. Tally, 1O2 Ala. 25, I5 So. 722 (1893).
i5. "An abettor is one who is actually or constructively present at the commission
of the deed and contributes to it by moral or physical force." WEnsTan's NEWv INTER.
DiciONxARY (r934). See also 4 BL. Co AM. *34-36; Shelton v. Commonwealth, 261
Ky. 18, 24, 86 S. W. (2d) 1054 (1935) ; State v. Epps, 213 N. C. 709, 713, 197 S. E.
58o (1938) ; Creasy v. Commonwealth, 166 Va. 721, 725, 186 S. E. 63 (1936) ; Krud-
wig v. Koepke, 223 Wis. 244, 249, 270 N. W. 79 (1936).
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sionally been employed to apply to a guilty party who was not present.-6
Rather than labor the point let it merely be said that this meaning is
arbitrarily assigned to the word for the purpose of the present discus-
sion. The term "aider and abettor" is more common and has been said
to be necessary to express the idea, 17 although the very court making
this suggestion has at other times used the word "abettor" alone.' 8 The
phrases "aid and abet" and "aider and abettor" seem unnecessarily
verbose. To "aid" is to render assistance and hence one might inno-
cently aid a perpetrator, without knowledge of his wrongful purpose.' 9
The word "abet" includes either the element of aid, or that of com-
manding, counseling or encouraging the crime without actual assistance
plus, in either case, the additional element of mens rea .20  For this rea-
son an instruction to convict the defendant if he aided or abetted any
other person to commit the crime has been held reversible error.21  In
other words, one who is present (actually or constructively) may aid
without abetting, where he acts innocently, or abet without aiding, as
by merely encouraging the perpetrator. Furthermore, any aid given
with mens rea is abetment; hence to add the word "aid" to the word
"abet" is not necessary and is sometimes misleading.
An "inciter", as the word is here used, is one who, with mens rea,
counsels, commands, procures or encourages another to commit a crime,
the one not being present either actually or constructively at the moment
of perpetration. The word has been so used at times by the courts.
22
If deemed necessary some such phrase as "absent inciter" might be
employed. The need is for a term to express the position of a culpable
party, not present either actually or constructively at the time of per-
petration, whose guilt relates to the commission of the crime itself
rather than to assistance rendered the offender afterwards. "Inciter"
or even "absent inciter" will be more convenient than to refer to a
misdemeanant as a "principal who would be an accessory before the fact
if the crime had been a felony", or to refer to a felon under some of
our statutes as a "principal who would have been an accessory before
the fact at common law".
23
16. Robertson v. State, 23 Ala. App. 267, 125 So. 6o (1929) ; State v. Powell, 168
N. C. 134, 141, 83 S. E. 310 (1914). Statutes have sometimes resorted to this usage.
See, e. g., OxLA. PEN. CODE (1931) § 18o8.
17. State v. Powell, 168 N. C. 134, 141, 83 S. E. 310 (1914).
18. See State v. Baldwin, 193 N. C. 566, 567, 137 S. E. 59o (1927).
ig. Anderson v. Board of Medical Examiners, 117 Cal. App. 113, 3 P. (2d) 344
(1931).
20. Ibid.
21. People v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486, 55 Pac. 581 (1898) ; State v. Corcoran, 7 Idaho
22o, 61 Pac. 1034 (19oo); State v. Allen, 34 Mont. 403, 87 Pac. 177 (1906).
22. See, e. g., Griffith v. State, go Ala. 583, 588, 8 So. 812 (1891).
23. "Instructions as to when accessories are principals reviewed, and held correct"
(Syllabus). State v. Slycord, 210 Iowa 1209, 232 N. W. 636 (193o).
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There is also need of a term to designate a person who was in no
way tainted with guilt of a crime when perpetrated but who, with full
knowledge of the facts, thereafter conceals the offender or gives him
some other assistance to save him from detection, arrest, trial or punish-
ment. Under some of the statutes abolishing the distinction between
the accessory before the fact and the principal, the word "accessory"
has been employed for this purpose.2 4  This may be the ultimate solu-
tion, but any general attempt to use the word in this sense at the present
time will cause confusion. The same is true of the phrase "accessory
after the fact", since the common law limited this to the felony cases.
Since no other term seems to have been employed for this purpose,
"criminal protector" is arbitrarily adopted for the present discussion.
Using the terms "perpetrator", "abettor", "inciter" and "criminal
protector" with the meanings thus arbitrarily assigned, the common law
classification of principals and accessories may be expressed in this
form:
(i) In treason, perpetrators, abettors, inciters and criminal pro-
tectors are all principals 25 "because of the heinousness of the
crime",26 and different degrees of principals are seldom even
mentioned.
(2) In felony:
(a) Perpetrators are principals in the first degree; 27
(b) Abettors are principals in the second degree; 28
(c) Inciters are accessories before the fact; 29 and
(d) Criminal protectors are accessories after the fact."3 0
24. Drury v. Territory, 9 Okla. 398, 6o Pac. ioi (igoo); Parrish v. State, 134
Tex. Cr. R. x87, i9o, 114 S. W. (2d) 559, 56o (1938). See also ARIz. REV. CODE
(Struckmeyer, 1928) §449i; CAr.. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§3I, 32; IDAHO CODE
ArN. (932) §§ 17-:204, 17-205; 2 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) c. 93, §§ 10732, 10733;
2 OKLA. STAT. (931) c. 15, §§ i8o8, 1809; 4 WAsH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932)
tit. 14, §§ 2260, 2261.
25. 4 BL. Comm. *35. "It is to be known, that a fact which would make one ac-
cessary in felony, in treason . . . makes him a principal. . . In treason all are
principals; . . ." Regina v. Tracy, 6 Mod. 31, 32, 87 Eng. Rep. R. 379 (1703).
26. 4 BL. Comm. *35.
27. "A principal in the first degree is he that is the actor or absolute perpetrator
of the crime; . . ." 4 BL. CoMM. *34.
28. Regina v. Brown, 14 Cox C. C. 144 (1878) ; Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98, i56
So. 237 (1934) ; State v. Coleman, 126 Fla. 203, i70 So. 722 (1936) ; McCoy v. State,
5o Ga. App. 54, 176 S. E. 912 (1934); Shelton v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. i8, 86 S. W.
(2d) I054 (i935) ; State v. Wilson, 39 N. M. 284, 46 P. (2d) 57 (1935).
29. r HALE P. C. *615; 4 BL. Coam. *37; Griffith v. State, 90 Ala. 583, 8 So. 812
(i89 ) ; Neumann v. State, i16 Fla. 98, i56 So. 237 (934) ; Shelton v. Commonwealth,
261 Ky. 18, 86 S. W. (2d) 1054 (I935).
30. I HALE P. C. *618; 4 BL. Comm. *37-8; Skelly v. United States, 76 F. (2d)
483 (C. C. A. ioth, 1935), cert. denied, 295 U. S. 757 (i935) ; Howard v. People, 97
Colo. 55o, 51 P. (2d) 594 (I935).
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(3) In misdemeanors:
(a) Perpetrators, abettors and inciters are all principals,31
because the law "does not descend to distinguish the different
shades of guilt in petty misdemeanors." 32
(b) Criminal protectors are not punishable as such.
33
Stated in terms of the common law itself, those who would be
accessories, either before or after the fact, in a felony case, are princi-
pals if the offense is treason; 4 whereas if the offense is only a mis-
demeanor, those who would be accessories before the fact, in a felony
case, are principals,35 while those who would be accessories after the
fact are not regarded as parties to the misdemeanor, in any capacity.
36
There is some authority for using the word "accomplice" to include
all principals and all accessories, 37 but the preferred usage is to include
all principals and accessories before the fact, but to exclude accessories
after the fact.38 If this limitation is adopted, the word "accomplice"
will embrace all perpetrators, abettors and inciters. It will also include
criminal protectors if the offense is treason but will not do so if it is a
felony or a misdemeanor.
II. THE COMMON LAW THEORY OF PARTIES
Appreciation of the common law theory of parties to crime re-
quires full acceptance of the concept of one crime with guilt attaching
to several. Thus if a felony had been committed and four were guilty
thereof, they might be respectively (I) principal in the first degree, (2)
31. I HALE P. C. *613; 4 BL. CoMm. *36; Regina v. Tracy, 6 Mod. 31, 32, 87 Eng.
Rep. R. 379 (1703) ; Commonwealth v. Jaffas, 284 Mass. 417, 419, 188 N. E. 263 (1933).
See also Cole v. State, 27 Ala. App. go, 166 So. 58 (1936) ; Shi v. State, 52 Ga. App.
358, 183 S. E. 331 (1936) ; State v. Garzio, 113 N. J. L. 349, 353, 175 Ati. 98 (I934),
aff'd, 116 N. J. L. i89, 183 Atl. 166 (1936).
32. 4 Br. COMM. *36.
33. I HALE P. C. *613; Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. R. 362, 1o2 Pac. 57 (9o9).
34. 4 Bi. COMM. *35; Regina v. Tracy, 6 Mod. 31, 32, 87 Eng. Rep. R. 379 (1703).
35. I HALE P. C. *613; 4 BL. CoMm. *36; Regina v. Tracy, 6 Mod. 31, 32, 87 Eng.
Rep. R. 379 (1703) ; Cole v. State, 27 Ala. App. go, 166 So. 58 (1936) ; Commonwealth
v. Jaffas, 284 Mass. 417, 419, I88 N. E. 263, 264 (1934) ; Hamilton v. State, 54 Ga.
App. 249, 187 S. E. 594 (1936); Collier v. State, 54 Ga. App. 674, 187 S. E. 843
(1936); State v. Garzio, 113 N. J. L. 349, 353, 175 Atl. 98, ioo (934), affd, 116 N. J.
L. i89, 183 Atl. 166 (1936).
36. I HALE P. C. *613; Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. R. 362, 102 Pac. 57 (o9);
State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 548, 70 P. (2d) 458 (1937).
37. Parrish v. State, 134 Tex. Cr. R. 187, 114 S. W. (2d) 559 (1938). And see
State v. Powell, 168 N. C. 134, 141, 83 S. E. 310 (1914).
38. "The word [accomplice] includes in its meaning all persons who participate in
the commission of a crime, whether they so participate as principals, aiders, and abet-
tors, or accessories before the fact. . . . But . . . an accessory after the fact is
not an accomplice. . . " Levering' v. Commonwealth, 132 Ky. 666, 677, 679, 117
S. W. 253, 257 (19o9) ; accord, People v. Sweeney, 213 N. Y. 37, 46, io6 N. E. 913,
917 (1914). An accessory after fact is not an accomplice of the principal and the prin-
cipal may be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of such a one. State v. Umble,
115 Mo. 452, 22 S. W. 378 (1893); People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737
(18gi).
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principal in the second degree, (3) accessory before the fact, and (4)
accessory after the fact; or two or more of them might jointly occupy
any one of these positions. Two factors tended to obscure the true
common law position. One was the requirement that the accessory be
tried where his act of accessoryship occurred and not where the felony
was perpetrated, if the two were in different counties; a rule which was
due to an early statute and not to the common law theory of parties. 39
The other was the possibility, recognized from the first as far as prin-
cipals were concerned, of convicting one person of murder and another
of manslaughter, based upon the same killing.40 This also was the
result of legislation. In the English common law there was but one
crime of felonious homicide (if petit treason is ignored). The division
of this into murder and manslaughter resulted from early statutes
intended to exclude the more heinous types of homicide from benefit of
clergy.41 In its origin this was merely a difference in penalty dependent
upon the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances, and no
doubt it would have been worded in terms of "degrees" of the crime if
that concept had been in use at the time. For most purposes murder
and manslaughter have come to be regarded as distinct offenses, but the
common law never entirely lost sight of the notion that the crime is
felonious homicide, of which murder and manslaughter are but different
grades. 42 This is clearly the view taken with reference to the common
law of parties to homicide.
Under some of the modern statutes it may be necessary to speak
of the accessory as guilty of a separate substantive offense, 43 but this
is an undesirable fiction as far as the accessory before the fact is con-
cerned, because his offense is separate and "substantive" only to the
extent that certain of the procedural difficulties of the common law are
abrogated, 44 a result equally attainable by more direct legislative lan-
39. I HALE P. C. *623. As to the reason behind this statute, compare a similar
enactment in case of a wound inflicted in one county resulting in death in another. i
HALE P. C. *426.
40. i HALE P. C. *438; i EAST P. C. *350. Several persons may be guilty of dif-
ferent degrees of the same homicide. Red v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 667, 47 S. W. IOO3
(1898). One may abet in the heat of passion what another perpetrates from malice
aforethought. State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa 66o, 92 N. W. 876 (1902) ; Mickey v. Com-
monwealth, 9 Bush 593 (Ky. 1873). On the other hand one may with malice afore-
thought encourage another to kill which the other does in the sudden heat of passion.
Parker v. Commonwealth, 18o Ky. 102, 201 S. W. 475 (1918).
41. 12 HEN. VII, c. 7 (1496) ; 4 HEN. VIII, c. 2 (1512) ; 23 HEN. VIII, c. I, §§ 3,
4 (1531) ; i EDW. VI, c. 12, § 10 (1547).
42. "Upon an indictment of murder, tho the party upon his trial be acquit of the
murder, and convict of manslaughter, he shall receive judgment, as if the indictment
had been of manslaughter, for the offense in substance is the same." i HALE P. C. *438.
43. 1; re Vann, 136 Fla. 113, 186 So. 424 (1939); State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84
(1848) ; Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349, ig N. E. (2d) 62 (1939) ; Dink-
lage v. State, 135 Tex. Cr. R. 10, 117 S. W. (2d) in (1938); State v. Bowman, 92
Utah 540, 70 P. (2d) 458 (1937).
44. Karakutza v. State, 163 Wis. 293, 298, 156 N. W. 965 (ii6).
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guage. 45 A different emphasis is observable even in the statement of
the position. Hale would speak of "an accessory to murder before the
fact",46 whereas at the present time the statement may be in some such
form as "an accessory before the fact to the crime of murder".47  The
common law theory was well expressed by the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee in a murder case:
"The offense is compounded of the connivance of the acces-
sory and the actual killing by the principal felon, and the crime of
the accessory, though inchoate in the act of counseling, hiring, or
commanding, is not consummate until the deed is actually done.
The law in such case, holds the accessory before the fact to be
guilty of the murder itself, not as principal, it is true, but as acces-
sory before the fact, for it is the doing of the deed, and not the
counseling, hiring, or commanding that makes his crime complete;
and it is for the murder that he is indicted, and not for the counsel-
ing and procuring." 48
This is to be contrasted with the crime of solicitation or incite-
ment, which was present according to the common law whenever one
solicited another to commit a felony 49 or a grave misdemeanor.' 0 The
essence of this offense is the incitement and the crime is complete with-
out the perpetration of the offense solicited,51 even if the other party
promptly refuses the improper request.. 2 In fact, if the solicited offense
is committed as a result of the solicitation, the incitement is merged
in the other crime and the common law required the inciter to be in-
dicted as a party to that offense rather than for the solicitation.5" Some
45. Compare MASS. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1933), C. 274, §3, with IOWA CODE
(1939) § 12895, which reads: "The distinction between an accessory before the fact and
a principal is abrogated, and all persons concerned in the commission of a public
offense . . . must hereafter be indicted, tried and punished as principals."
46. i HALE P. C. *435.
47. Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. 165, I66, 299 S. W. 737 (1927).
48. State v. Ayers, 67 Tenn. 96, ioo (1874).
w . . it is 'the known and familiar principle of criminal jurisprudence, that he
who commands, or procures a crime to be done, if it is done, is guilty of the crime, and
the act is his act." Per Mr. Justice Story in U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 46o, 469
(1827).
49. State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 12I Atl. 8o5 (1923); Walsh v. People, 65 Ill.
58 (1872) ; State v. Sullivan, iio Mo. App. 75, 84 S. W. 105 (904) ; Rex v. Higgins,
2 EAST 5, 102 Eng. Rep. R. 269 (18O).
5o. State v. Donovan, 5 Boyce 40, go Atl. 22o (Del. 1914); Cox v. People, 82 Ill.
i9i (1876) ; Commonwealth v. McGregor, 6 Pa. Dist. R. 343 (897); Rex v. Butler,
6 Car. & P. 368, 172 Eng. Rep. R. 1280 (1834). Contra: Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524,
io Atl. 208 (1887) ; cf. State v. Sullivan, IIo Mo. App. 75, 84 S. W. IO5 (io4) ; Com-
monwealth v. Harrington, 3 Pick. 26 (Mass. 1825).
5i. Regina v. Gregory, IO Cox C. C. 459 (I867).
52. State v. Quinlan, 86 N. J. L. 120, 91 Atl. IiI (914) ; State v. Hampton, 21o
N. C. 283, x86 S. E. 251 (1936).
53. Rex v. Higgins, 2 EAST 5, 19, 102 Eng. Rep. R. 269, 275 (1801). In this case
Mr. Justice Grose suggests that this is true where the solicited offense is a felony, on
the ground that a misdemeanor merges in a resulting felony. This result, however,
seems not properly controlled by the disputed point as to whether a misdemeanor is
merged in a resulting felony. See as to such merger, Regina v. Button, 3 Cox C. C.
229 (I848), and Note (1925) 37 A. L. R. 778. It is rather comparable to the general
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of the modern statutes have greatly limited the scope of solicitation as
a separate offense.5
4
By the common law theory the accessory after the fact was also
guilty of the original felony. His assistance to the known felon related
back to the crime itself and tainted him with guilt of that very offense,r 5
and subjected him to the same penalty except as the rigor of this rule
was modified by statute. 0 But while the common law viewed guilt as
accessory before the fact and guilt as principal as "in substance the
same", "5 7 it recognized that the accessory after the fact was really tainted
with "a different species of guilt".5 8
Reference to this theory of subsequent culpable conduct relating
back to the original offense, and uniting with it, requires mention of
certain types of misconduct after a crime which are punishable on an
entirely different basis, such as misprision of felony and compounding
a felony. A "misprisor" is one who knows of the commission of a
crime and does not disclose it to the proper authorities. A misprisor
was never regarded as a party to the original crime 59 but misprision of
felony was punished as a misdemeanor at common law.0 0 There seems
to be a tendency for misprision of felony to be ignored at the present
time,(" but misprision of treason is frequently found in the statutes. 2
merger of an attempt in the completed offense. 12 CAIx. B. REv. 523 (1934). Solicita-
tion, however, is to be distinguished from attempt. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177
Mass. 267, 59 N. E. 55 (190).
54. For example, very little of the common law offense of solicitation will be found
in the IowA CODE (1939), and nothing omitted from the statutes is punishable in Iowa
merely because it was recognized as a common law crime. Estes v. Carter, IO Iowa
400 (186o). In some states, on the other hand, much of the law of solicitation is re-
tained. State v. Hampton, 21o N. C. 283, 186 S. E. 251 (1936).
55. Note Blackstone's use of the phrase "ex post facto." 4 BL. Comm. *37. Not
merely after the fact but "by an after fact."
56. Id. at 39.
57. I HALE P. C. *626. "Incitement and execution are touched with equal guilt."
Per Mr. Justice Cardozo in People v. Emieleta, 238 N. Y. 158, 163, 144 N. E. 487, 489
(1924).
58. 4 BL. CoMM. *40. See also i HALE P. C. *626.
59. "If A. knows that B. hath committed a felony, but doth not discover it, this
doth not make A. an accessary after, but it is misprision of felony, for which A. may
be indicted, and upon his conviction fined and imprisoned." I HALE P. C. *618.
6o. Ibid. "Misprision of felony is also the concealment of a felony which a man
knows but never assented to; for if he assented, this makes him either principal or ac-
cessory." 4 BL. COMM. *121.
61. The common law offense of misprision of felony, being wholly unsuited to
American criminal law and procedure, was never a substantive crime in this state.
People v. Lefkovitz, 294 Mich. 263, 293 N. W. 642 (1940) ; cf. State v. Graham, i9o
La. 669, 182 So. 711 (1938). Misprision of felony is found in the federal statutes. I8
U. S. C. A. § 251. But the words "whoever . . . conceals" have been held to re-
quire something more than a negative failure to report the felony, some affirmative act
of concealment. Neal v. United States, 102 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) ; Bratton
v. United States, 73 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. ioth, 1934).
62. E. g.: "Misprision of treason shall consist in the knowledge and concealment
of treason, without otherwise assenting to or participating in the crime. Any person
found guilty thereof shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term of not less than
one year and not more than two years." ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) § 38-557.
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A "compounder" is one who knows of the crime and agrees, for some
reward, received or promised, not to prosecute.6 3  The compounder of
a felony seems anciently to have been regarded as a party to the fel-
ony, 4 but in the later common law his guilt was not that of the original
felony but of a misdemeanor known as "compounding a felony".65
Compromising certain misdemeanors is now frequently authorized by
statute.6 6  Compounding a felony is generally a crime, either felony or
misdemeanor, 67 and by some enactments the compounding of any
offense is punishable unless a compromise is expressly allowed by law.
68
In the absence of some unusual statutory extension, 9 one must be
more than a misprisor or a compounder to be constituted a "criminal
protector" as the term is here used. It is not enough that he merely
keep silent and fail to prosecute, either with or without a reward. To
be a "criminal protector" he must, with guilty knowledge of the offense,
"receive, relieve, comfort or assist" 70 the offender, in order to hinder
his "detection, apprehension, trial or punishment".
71
Emphasis upon the theory of one offense with guilt attaching to
several is quite appropriate because it is still part of the groundwork of
our legal philosophy, as far as perpetrators, abettors and inciters are
concerned, in spite of the fact that some of the statutes require lip-
service to the notion of a separate substantive offense, in the effort to
avoid certain procedural difficulties. 72  It explains how one may be
guilty of a crime he could not perpetrate, by having caused or procured
it as a result of his abetment or incitement. 73  Thus while a woman
cannot herself perpetrate rape she may be guilty of a rape resulting
63. 4 Br- COMM. *133.
64. 2 HAWK. P. C., c. 59, § 6; 4 BL. COMM. *133-4.
65. 4 BL. COMM. *133-4.
66. E. g., IOWA CODE (I939) c. 659.
67. E. g., IOWA CODE (939) c. 589.
68. See NEW Yoax CRIM. LAW AND PEN. CODE ANN. (Gilbert, 1935) § 570.
69. E. g., Howard v. People, 97 Colo. 55o, 51 P. (2d) 594 (935).
70. 4 BL. COmm. *37; Wren v. Commonwealth, 26 Gratt. 952, 955 (Va. 1875).
Misprision of felony does not make the misprisor an accessory after the fact. State v.
Doty, 57 Kan. 835 (1897); Hightower v. State, 78 Tex. Cr. P. 606, 182 S. W. 492
(I916).
This is true even under a statute which punishes all persons who know of the
commission of felony and "conceal it from the magistrate" because "conceal" means
more than mere non-disclosure. People v. Garnett, 129 Cal. 364, 6i Pac. 1114 (9oo).
71. Skelly v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 483, 488 (C. C. A. ioth, 1935), cert. denied,
295 U. S. 757 (935).
72. "Every one is a party to an offense who either actually commits the offense or
does some act which forms part of the offense, or assists in the actual commission of
the offense, or of any act which forms part thereof, or directly or indirectly counsels
or procures any person to commit the offense or do any act forming a part thereof."
State v. Scott, 8o Conn. 317, 323, 68 Atl. 258 (I9o7). As to statutes speaking of the
accessory before the fact as guilty of a "substantive" offense, see FLA. ComP. GmN.
LAWS (1927) § 7111; MASS. ANN. LAws (Michie, 1933) c. 274, § 3.
73. England v. State, 23 Ala. App. 361, 125 So. 687 (i93o) ; Gibbs v. State, 37
Ariz. 273, 293 Pac. 976 (1930) ; State v. Nahoum, 172 La. 83, 133 So. 370 (i93i) ;
State v. Flaherty, 128 Me. 141, 146 Atl. 7 (1929) ; Watson v. State, i58 Tenn. 212, 12
S. W. (2d) 375 (928).
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from her incitement 74 or her abetment; 75 and a man may be guilty of
the rape of his own wife although he cannot himself perpetrate such
rape.76 On the same ground a woman may be guilty of assault to
commit rape,77 a single person may be guilty of bigamy, 78 one not
related to any other party to the crime may be guilty of incest,79 one
who has given no mortgage may be guilty of unlawful disposal of mort-
gaged property,"" and one who holds no federal office may be guilty of
false return by a postmaster.81 The possibility of guilt by one not in
a position to do the prohibited deed has been recognized in connection
with numerous other offenses, such as embezzlement by a fiduciary,
8 2
embezzlement by a public officer,83 fraudulent withholding of funds by
a tax collector,84 misapplication of bank funds, 8 5 mother's concealment
of the birth of a bastard child, 6 unlawful sale of its own securities by
a corporation,87 violation of election law,88 and violation of traffic law
by the driver of a vehicle.8 9 It is hardly necessary to add that two act-
ing together may perpetrate a crime to which each contributes an essen-
tial part. Where, for example, one beats a victim with a stick while
a confederate holds a gun on him to prevent resistance, both offenders
may be convicted under a statute providing a special penalty for beating
a person while possessing a deadly weapon to prevent him from defend-
ing himself. 90
74. Rex v. Baltimore, 4 Burr. 2179, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 136 (1768).
75. Regina v. Ram, 17 Cox C. C. 6og (1893); State v. Bums, 82 Conn. 213, 72
Atl. 1083 (igog) ; see People v. Trumbley, 252 Ill. 29, 96 N. E. 573 (1911); State v.
Williams, 32 La. Ann. 335 (i88o) ; Campbell v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 595, 141 S. W.
232 (1911).
76. Audley's Case, 3 How. ST. T. 401 (1631); State v. Boyland, 24 Kan. i86
(i88o) ; People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 28 N. W. 896 (1886) ; People v. Meli, 193
N. Y. Supp. 365 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; State v. Dowell, io6 N. C. 722, 11 S. E. 525 (89o).
77. State v. Jones, 83 N. C. 6o5 (i88o).
78. Boggus v. State, 34 Ga. 275 (1866) ; State v. Warady, 78 N. J. L. 6§7, 75 Atl.
977 (i9o9). On this basis it has been held that an unmarried man who marries a mar-
ried woman, knowing her to be married, may be convicted of bigamy.even if there is
no statute expressly covering such a case. Regina v. Brawn, i Car. & K. 144, 174 Eng.
Rep. R- 75I (M. P. 1843).
79. Cf. Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 632, 633, 27 S. W. 83, 84 (1894).
8o. State v. Elliott, 61 Kan. 518, 59 Pac. 1047 (I9OO).
8I. United States v. Snyder, 14 Fed. 554 (C. C. Minn. 1882).
82. Gibbs v. State, 37 Ariz. 273, 293 Pac. 976 (1930).
83. State v. Rowe, 104 Iowa 323, 73 N. W. 833 (i8g8) ; Hutchman v. State, 6I
Okla. Cr. R. 117, 66 P. (2d) 99 (1937).
84. Quillin v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. R. 497, 187 S. W. 199 (i9i6).
85. State v. Johnson, 50 S. D. 394, 21o N. W. 353 (1926).
86. State v. Sprague, 4 R. I. 257 (856).
87. State v. Fraser, io5 Ore. 589, 209 Pac. 467 (1922).
88. Bartlett v. State, 27 Ga. App. 7, 107 S. E. 347 (1921).
89. People v. Hoaglin, 262 Mich. 162, 247 N. W. 141 (933). One charged with
unlawful possession of three or more pieces of counterfeit coin (a felony) may be con-
victed on proof that such coins were in the possession of another with whom he was
acting in guilty concert. Regina v. Rogers, 2 Mood. 85, 169 Eng. Rep. R. 34 (839).
One not an officer who incites or abets an officer to procure a bribe may be convicted
of asking or receiving a bribe. Capshaw v. State, 104 P. (2d) 282 (Okla. Cr. R. 194o).
go. Hardy v. State, i8o Miss. 336, 177 So. 9II (1938).
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Three exceptions have been made to the general rule recognizing
guilt by incitement or abetment where perpetration itself is impossible:
(I) where the very purpose of the crime is to protect one of the parties
to the prohibited transaction, (2) where the purpose is other than this
but the legislative body must have contemplated two parties and yet
provided a penalty for only one, and (3) where a statute creating an
offense limited in its application to persons who qualify in some partic-
ular manner, has its own incitement and abetment clause which is also
limited in its scope.
(i) If the very purpose of the crime is to protect a type of persons
thought to be in need of special protection, one within this group is not
guilty by reason of having incited or abetted the perpetration by an-
other. Hence a girl under the age of consent cannot be convicted of
"statutory rape", even upon proof that she enticed or procured a man
to have carnal intercourse with her, because it "cannot be said that an
Act . . . the whole object of which is to protect women against men,
is to be construed so as to render a girl against whom an offence is
committed equally liable with the man by whom the offence is com-
mitted." 91 (2) If a statutory offense involves a transaction between
two persons or groups of persons, and provides a penalty only for
those engaging in one side of the transaction, those on the other side
cannot be convicted as inciters or abettors since their omission from the
penal provision evinces a legislative purpose to leave their participation
unpunished.9 2  Hence a purchaser of intoxicating liquor is not punish-
able under a statute which merely provides a penalty for the sale
thereof.93 (3) A statute providing a penalty for certain misconduct
by persons who qualify in some particular manner may limit guilt by
incitement or abetment to those having the same qualifications by having
a special incitement and abetment clause of its own limited in this
manner.
9 4
91. Regina v. Tyrell, 17 Cox C. C. 716, 719 (1893).
92. Holding that an unmarried person is not guilty of adultery by having sexual
intercourse with a married person, even on the theory of aiding and abetting the other,
because the manifested intent of the legislature was to apply the penalty only to the
married person to such intercourse, the court adds: "Of course, an unmarried person
might be guilty as a principal of this offense, under section 31 of the Penal Code, by
aiding and assisting in its commission in some other way than by living in a state of
illicit intercourse with a married person; . . ." Ex parte Cooper, 162 Cal. 81, 85,
121 Pac. 318, 320 (1912).
93. United States v. Farrar, 281 U. S. 624 (1930) ; Wilson v. State, i3o Ark. 204,
196 S. W. 921 (1917); State v. Teahan, 5o Conn. 92 (1882); Wakeman v. Chambers,
69 Iowa 169,28 N. W. 498 (1886) ; State v. Cullins, 53 Kan. 100, 36 Pac. 56 (1894).
A contrary view was expressed in an early Tennessee case. State v. Bonner, 39 Tenn.
135 (1858). But this case was distinguished later in a case recognizing the exception.
H-arney v. State, 76 Tenn. 113 (1881).
94. State v. Furth, 82 Wash. 665, 144 Pac. 907 (1914). This is not a well-consid-
ered opinion and it is doubtful if this statute has an aider and abettor clause intended
to exclude other aiders and abettors; but there is no doubt of the legislative power to
include such a restriction by the use of a clause clearly manifesting such an intent.
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III. PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES
Mention has been made of certain advantages to be derived from
the use of terms other than "principal" and "accessory" to express the
relation of a culpable party to the crime. Additional advantages are to
be found as a result of the modern practice of dividing offenses into
degrees. It is much less confusing, for example, to speak of a perpe-
trator of second degree murder, or an abettor of first degree murder,
than it is to refer to a principal in the first degree to murder in the
second degree, or a principal in the second degree to murder in the
first degree.95 With all of this, however, the suggested terms are
merely offered as possible aids to a general consideration of the field and
with no thought that the traditional terms can be abruptly abandoned.
As will be mentioned presently, modern statutes have not completely
removed from all jurisdictions the handicaps developed by the common
law distinction between principals and accessories, and these terms
must be retained because of this fact alone. Even if the last trace of
such handicaps had entirely disappeared it would still be necessary to
speak of "principals" and "accessories" to explain how the present law
differs from the old.
It is important to repeat that the common law distinction between
principals and accessories has no application to treason 96 or to mis-
demeanors, 97 and that this is just as true of offenses created by statute
as of those originally recognized by the common law.98 Nor are the
parties to such offenses distinguished as principals in the first degree
or in the second degree. 99 It is true that guilt of such crimes may be
incurred by incitement or abetment 10 as well as by perpetration, but
this has always been merely a matter of evidence and has never been
permitted to develop stumbling blocks in the path of the enforcement
of justice.101 In these fields the position of the criminal protector has
been equally free from procedural complications. He who aids a known
traitor in the effort to save him from the legal consequences of his
95. "The indictment charged the defendant with the offense of murder in the first
degree as principal in the second degree." McCall v. State, I2O Fla. 707, 708, x63 So.
38, 39 (1935).
96. i HALE P. C. *612-3 ; 4 BL. Comm. *35-6.
97. Ibid.; Snead v. State, 62 Ga. App. 54i, 8 S. E. (2d) 735 (I94o) ; Kemp v.
State, 6i Ga. App. 337, 339, 6 S. E. (2d) 196, 197 (1939) ; Stone v. State, 133 Tex. Cr.
R. 527, 112 S. W. (2d) 465 (1938).
98. State v. Woodworth, 121 N. J. L. 78, I A. (2d) 254 (1938).
99. Dowdy v. State, 44 Ga. App. 569, 162 S. E. I55 (1932).
ioo. Commonwealth v. Bitler, 133 Pa. Super. 268, 281, 2 A. (2d) 493 (1938).
ioi. Collier v. State, 54 Ga. App. 346, 187 S. E. 843 (1936) ; State v. Cook, i49
Kan. 481, 87 P. (2d) 648 (939). It is proper to charge one with aiding and abetting
in the commission of a misdemeanor. People v. Hoaglin, 262 Mich. 162, 247 N. W.
r41 (1933). But this is not necessary. Under an indictment charging the defendant
with the commission of a misdemeanor his guilt may be established by showing that
the offense was committed by his command or inducement. United States v. Gooding,
12 Wheat. 46o (U. S. 1827) ; State v. Warady, 78 N. J. L. 687, 75 Atl. 977 (I9io).
594 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
crime is guilty of treason as a principal; 102 while he who renders such
aid to a misdemeanant does not by so doing become tainted with the
guilt of that misdemeanor, and hence is not a party thereto.10
All of this was quite different in trials on charges of felony, includ-
ing felonies created by statute 104 as well as others. The results of the
common law distinction between principals and accessories were of tre-
mendous importance in the realm of procedure; but before speaking of
these results it is necessary to consider the distinction itself. Confusion
of terms must be carefully avoided. If one employs another to repre-
sent him in a legal transaction, the one is a principal and the other is
his agent, but if one employs another to commit a felony for him, and
tbe other carries out the unlawful commission with full knowledge of
the facts, and in the absence of the first party, the employee (assuming
criminal capacity on his part) is the principal and the employer is an
accessory before the fact. 10 5
A. Principal in the First Degree
"The distinction between principals in the first and second degrees
is a distinction without a difference" 106 except in those rare instances
in which some unusual statute has provided a different penalty for one
of these than for the other.' 07 "A principal in the first degree is the
immediate perpetrator of the crime while a principal in the second
degree is one who did not commit the crime with his own hands but
was present aiding and abetting the principal." 18 It may be added, in
the words of Mr. Justice Miller, that one may perpetrate a crime, not
only with his own hands, but "through the agency of mechanical or
chemical means, as by instruments, poison or powder, or by an animal,
child, or other innocent agent" acting under his direction.' 09
There may be joint principals in the first degree, as where two or
more cause the death of another by beating, stabbing, shooting or other
means, in which both, or all, participate. If, however, one holds a
victim while a second inflicts a fatal injury with a knife, only the stabber
is a principal in the first degree, because the stabbing caused the death
and the holding was merely aiding, thus rendering the holder guilty as
1o2. ". knowing receivers and comforters of traitors, are all principals." i
HALE P. C. *613.
lO3. Ibid.
lo4. Ibid.; State v. Woodworth, 121 N. J. L. 78, 82-3, I A. (2d) 254, 258 (1938).
105. If "the person employed is guilty, he is the principal, and his employer but an
accessory." Wixon v. State, 5 Park. Cr. R. 119, 129 (N. Y. 186).
lo6. State v. Whitt, 113 N. C. 716, 720, 18 S. E. 715, 719 (1893). See also, Reed
v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 126, IOO S. W. 856 (1907).
107. State v. Woodworth, 121 N. J. L. 78, 83, I A. (2d) 254, 258 (1938). For an
illustration of this very rare difference in penalty see Rex v. Sterne, i Leach 473, 168
Eng. Rep. R. 338 (1787).
io8. In re Vann, 136 Fla. 113, 118, 186 So. 424, 426 (1939). See also i HALE P.
C. *615; 4 Bi.. Comm. *34-
iog. Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F. (2d) 292, 297 (App. D. C. 1939).
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a principal in the second degree.110 It might be suggested that the
principal in the second degree be limited to one whose abetment was in
the form of counsel, command or encouragement, and that any principal
giving physical aid be said to be of the first degree; but this is unaccept-
able because it would place in the latter category one who was unable
to perpetrate the crime. It would be an obvious confusion of terms to
speak of a woman as guilty of rape as a principal in the first degree,
although she may be guilty of this crime as a principal in the second
degree.:"'
If the crime is the result of two or more essential acts, all guilty
parties who perform any of these acts are joint principals in the first
degree, as where one conspirator prints the blank forms to be used in
forgery and another fills in the false signatures.112 This is true, more-
over, even if neither is present when the other is performing his part
of the criminal plan. 113
While speaking of presence it may be well to add that the actual
perpetrator of a felony is always a principal in the first degree whether
be was present at the moment of the culmination of his felonious
scheme or not. 1 4  Perhaps it would be more in keeping with our mode
of expression in other situations to say that the actual perpetrator is
always present, either actually or constructively, at the moment of per-
petration. 115 Whether we speak in terms of constructive presence in
this connection or not, there is no question with reference to the guilt
of the perpetrator, the one who, with mens rea, has caused the socially
harmful occurrence without the assistance of any guilty agent. 18
Typical instances of one who is guilty as a principal in the first degree,
although he was not actually present in person at the moment of perpe-
tration, include the perpetrator who left poison so that it was inadver-
tently taken by the victim while the former was not present; "1 the
perpetrator who accomplished the same end by laying a bomb, trap or
iio. "And anciently, he that struck the stroke, whereof the party died was only
the principal, and those, that were present, aiding, and assisting, were but in the nature
of accessaries. .. " I HALE P. C. *437. These assisters were the ancient accesso-
ries at the fact who later became principals in the second degree.
iii. State v. Williams, 32 La. Ann. 335 (188o).
112. Rex v. Bingley, Russ. and Ry. 446, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 89o (1821). See also
Rex v. Kirkwood, i Mood. 304, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 1281 (1831).
113. Regina v. Kelly, 2 Car. & K. 379, 175 Eng. Rep. R. 157 (N. P. 1847); Alex-
ander v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
114. I HALE P. C. *435; 4 BL. Commr. *35.
115. For example, in determining the issue of jurisdiction, a perpetrator is said to
be constructively present at the point of perpetration. State v. Hall. 114 N. C. 9o9, Ig
S. E. 602 (1894).
II6. People v. Whitmer, 369 Ill. 317, I6 N. E. (2d) 757 (1938).
x17. I HALE P. C. *435.
11S. 4 BL Comm. *35. The use of the bomb for this purpose has developed since
the time of Blackstone and hence it is not mentioned by him.
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pitfall, 1"8 by setting a wild beast upon the other,119 by shooting from a
distance,12 0 by sending poison to his victim by the hands of an innocent
agent,' 2 ' or by procuring a child of tender years,
12
1 or a madman, 1 23
to commit the harmful deed. On the other hand, one who employs a
guilty agent to commit a felony is not a principal in any degree, but is
an accessory before the fact,1 24 if the crime is committed during his
absence. Thus one who procures a boy to steal for him while he is
not around is a principal in the first degree if the boy carries away the
property as an innocent agent,1 2 5 but is an accessory before the fact if
the boy does this act as a guilty party."2
B. Principal in the Second Degree
Even as a matter of common law the distinction between principals
in the first degree and those in the second degree is one of fact rather
than of legal consequence. Their guilt is exactly the same 127 unless in
a particular case some factor of mitigation or aggravation applies to
one and not the other, and if this is true either principal may be guilty
of a higher grade of the crime than the other.1 28  A principal in the
second degree is one who is guilty of felony by reason of having aided,
counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof in his
presence, either actual or constructive. He differs from the principal in
the first degree in that he does not do the deed himself or with the aid
of an innocent agent, but aids, commands, counsels or encourages a
culpable party to perpetrate the felony,' 29 and he differs from the
accessory before the fact only in the requirement of presence. The
principal in the second degree must be present at the perpetration of
119. 4 B. Comm. *35-
120. State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602 (1894).
121. Regina v. Michael, 2 Mood. 121, 169 Eng. Rep. R. 48 (184o) ; Memo., Kel. J.,
53, 84 Eng. Rep. R. 1079 1708).
122. Regina v. Manley, i Cox C. C. 104 (1844).
123. I HAWK. P. C. c. I, § 7; I EAST P. C. *228. See also 4 BL. Com. *35;
Regina v. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 643 (1838) ; Johnson v. State, 142
Ala. 70, 38 So. 182, 2 L. R. A. (x. s.) 897 (1905).
124. Wixon v. People, 5 Park. Cr. R. 119 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1861).
125. People v. Walker, 361 Ill. 482, 198 N. E. 353 (1935) ; Asher v. State, 128
Tex. Cr. R. 388, 8I S. W. (2d) 681 (1935).
126. Regina v. Manley, I Cox C. C. lO4 (1844). See also Workman v. State, 23
N. E. (2d) 419 (Ind. 1939).
127. In re Vann, 136 Fla. X13, 118, 186 So. 424, 426 (1939); Clift v. Common-
wealth, 268 Ky. 573, 105 S. W. (2d) 557 (1937) ; State v. Holland, 211 N. C. 284, 189
S. E. 761 (937) ; State v. Griggs, 184 S. C. 304, 192 S. E. 36o (1937). In very rare
instances some unusual statute has provided for a different grade of guilt. See note
107 smipra.
128. I HALE P. C. *438; 2 HAWK. P. C. C. 29, § 7. And see Reed v. State, 39 Tex.
Cr. R. 667, 47 S. W. 1003 (1898).
i29. i HALE P. C. *438; 4 BL. CoMM. *34; State ex rel. Dooley v. Coleman, 126
Fla. 203, 170 So. 722 (1936) ; Hardy v. State, 18o Miss. 336, 177 So. 911 (1938) ; Kin-
der v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 840, 91 S. W. (2d) 68 (1936); Walrath v. State, 8
Neb. 8o (1878) ; State v. Ray, 212 N. C. 725, 194 S. E. 482 (1938) ; Methvin v. State,
60 Okla. Cr. R. i, 6o P. (2d) io62 (1936).
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the felony, either actually or constructively,'"0 whereas the accessory
before the fact must be absent.' 3 ' In other words, although neither
presence nor absence is of itself a determinant of guilt,132 yet if the
eiens rea is found to exist, the same command, counsel, procurement
or encouragement which will make a principal in the second degree of
one who is present (actually or constructively) at the time a felony is
committed, will make him an accessory before the fact if he is absent.
One who is present, let it be added, may become a principal in the
second degree, by guiltily rendering actual and immediate assistance to
the perpetrator 133 which the accessory before the fact would be unable
to contribute because of his absence.
Counsel, command or encouragement may be in the form of words
or gestures.13 4  Such a purpose "may be manifested by acts, words,
signs, motions, or any contact which unmistakably evinces a design to
encourage, incite, or approve of the crime". 135  Promises or threats are
very effective for this purpose, 136 but much less will meet the legal
requirement, as where a bystander merely emboldened the perpetrator
to kill the deceased. 1 37  Those present at an unlawful fist fight may
encourage continued blows by shouts or gestures, and if so will be
guilty of manslaughter if death should ensue.' 3 8 A very illuminating
case involved two drivers of different vehicles engaged in a race on a
public highway, each thereby stimulating the other to drive at a crim-
13o. Duke v. State, i37 Fla. 513, 188 So. 124 (1939). It is possible to find sug-
gestions to the effect that a conspirator need not be present to be a principal. See, e. g.,
Pinkard v. State, 3o Ga. 757, 759 (i86o). But see Hale's statement that no man can be
a principal in felony, unless he be present except in a case of leaving poison to be taken
by the victim in his absence. I HALE P. C. *438, 439. See also, Breaz v. State, 214
Ind. 31, 13 N. E. (2d) 952 (938); Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, ig N. E. (2d) 62
(Mass. I939) ; Norton v. People, 8 Cow. 137 (N. Y. 1828).
131. Regina v. Brown, 14 Cox C. C. I44 (1878) ; Griffith v. State, 9o Ala. 583, 8
So. 812 (i89o) ; Shelton v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. I8, 24, 86 S. W. (2d) 1054, 1057
(1935).
132. Walrath v. State, 8 Neb. 8o (1878) ; Gillard v. State, 128 Tex. Cr. R. 514, 82
S. W. (2d) 678 (i935). Needless to say, presence, together with other facts may be
very important as a matter of evidence. Futhermore, under the common law require-
ment that one charged as a principal could not be convicted on proof that he was an
accessory, and vice versa, the question of presence or absence might be a determinant
of the question of guilt as charged.
133. Harmon v. State, i66 Ala. 28, 52 So. 348 (910). -
134. Kinder v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 840, 9I S. W. (2d) 530 (i936) ; Cordes
v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 204, 112 S. W. 94 (I908).
135. See State v. Wilson, 39 N. M. 284, 289, 46 P. (2d) 57, 6o (I935).
136. See State v. Scott, So Conn. 317, 323, 68 Atl. 258, 26o (907).
137. People v. Blackwood, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 728, 96 P. (2d) 982 (I939) ; Hurd
v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 315, 78 S. W. (2d) 9 (i935) ; Cordes v. State, 54 Tex. Cr.
R. 204, 112 S. W. 943 (Igo8). This assumes an unlawful killing. A wife has a right
to encourage her husband to exercise his lawful privilege of self-defense. Hurd v.
Commonwealth, supra.
138. Rex v. Murphy, 6 Car. & P. 103, 172 Eng. Rep. R. 1164 (1833) ; Rex v. Har-
grave, 5 Car. & P. 170, I72 Eng. Rep. R. 925 (831). These cases indicate that mere
voluntary presence at an unlawful prize fight is sufficient for guilt of manslaughter if
one of the combatants should be killed in the match, but this was rejected by a later
case which required some encouragement to the fighters and held presence alone was
insufficient for this. Regina v. Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534 (r882).
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inally negligent pace, as a result of which a pedestrian was struck and
killed by one of the vehicles. The driver of that vehicle was held guilty
of manslaughter as a principal in the first degree and the other driver
was held guilty of the same offense as a principal in the second de-
gree.139 One may also encourage a crime by merely standing by for
the purpose of giving aid to the perpetrator if necessary, provided the
latter is aware of this purpose.140  Guilt or innocence of the abettor,
let it be added, is not determined by the quantum of his advice or
encouragement. If it is rendered to induce another to commit the crime
and actually has this effect, no more is required.' 41
Actual aid may be rendered in many ways, typical examples being
where a bystander, for the purpose of supplying the perpetrator with a
deadly weapon for instant use, tosses him a bludgeon 142 or hands him
a revolver 143 with which the victim is killed. He whose act contributes
one of the elements of the crime itself is a principal in the first degree, 144
and hence the aid needed for guilt in the second degree is less than this.
On the other hand, an act may have aided the actual result without
involving guilt in any degree if it was an unwitting contribution. If
felonious homicide is committed with a borrowed weapon the lender
will not be guilty of either murder or manslaughter, although the killing
follows very promptly after the lending, if he did not know or have
reason to expect that any unlawful use was contemplated by the bor-
rower. 145  And the fact that one strikes a person unlawfully with his
fist, after which another unexpectedly stabs the same victim fatally with
a knife, will not constitute the first offender a guilty party to the murder
if he had no knowledge of such an intent in the mind of the other and
the two had no common purpose in the sense of a like criminal intent.
146
In the words of Blackstone, 1 47 often quoted by the courts,1 48 "pres-
ence need not always be an actual and immediate standing by, within
sight or hearing of the fact; but there may be also a constructive
presence, as when one commits a robbery or murder, and another keeps
139. Regina v. Swindall and Osborne, 2 Car. & K. 230, I75 Eng. Rep. R. 95
(1846).
i4o. Hicks v. United States, i5o U. S. 442 (I893) ; State v. Tally, IO2 Ala. 25, 15
So. 722 (1893).
141. People v. Washburn, 285 Mich. 119, 28o N. W. 132 (938); accord, Work-
man v. State, 2z N. E. (2d) 712 (Ind. 1939).
142. Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391 (i8o8).
143. McCoy v. State, 5o Ga. App. 54, 176 S. E. 912 (1934) ; State v. Williams,
i89 S. C. ig, 199 S. E. 9o6 (938).
i44. Hardy v. State, i8o Miss. 336, 177 So. 91, (1938).
145. Anderson v. State, 9I P. (2d) 794 (Okla. 1939) ; accord, Mowery v. State,
I32 Tex. Cr. R. 408, 105 S. W. (2d) 239 (I937).
146. State v Porter, 276 Mo. 387, 207 S. W. 774 (i918) ; accord, Turner v. Com-
monwealth, 268 Ky. 311, 104 S. W. (2d) 1085 (937).
147. 4 BL. CoMM. *34; cf. I HALE P. C. *439; Neumann v. State, ii6 Fla. 98, i56
So. 237 (r934) ; Collins v. State, 88 Ga. 347, 14 S. E. 474 (I89z); Walrath v. State,
8 Neb. 8o (1878) ; State v. Wilson, 39 N. M. 284, 46 P. (2d) 57 (i935).
148. Mulligan v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 229, 231-2, I S. W. 417 (i886).
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watch or guard at some convenient distance." A person is regarded as
constructively present, within the rules relating to parties in criminal
cases, whenever he is cooperating with the perpetrator and "is so situ-
ated as to be able to aid him, with a view known to the other, to insure
success in the accomplishment of the common purpose". 149 The typical
example of constructive presence is that of the "sentinel" stationed
outside to watch, while his associates enter a building for the purpose
of robbery or burglary.'" Another illustration is found in the case of
a "helper" who took his stand 150 yards away from the scene of the
actual shooting, armed with a rifle which would be fatal at that distance,
with intent to make use of it if the occasion should require.' 51  The
posting of a guard to give warning so that illicit liquor might be dis-
posed of before the arrival of officers has been a rather common
device. 152 The most extreme application of the doctrine of "construc-
tive presence" involved the hold-up of a stagecoach. One of the con-
spirators stationed himself on a mountain top, thirty or forty miles
from the intended ambush, and signaled the approach of the vehicle by
means of a controlled fire. Because he was so situated as to be of assist-
ance at the moment, he was held to be a principal in the second degree.1
53
Presence, although indispensable to the position of the principal in
the second degree, is not the only requirement. 154  In fact, presence at
the scene of an offense is not of itself sufficient to constitute any sort of
criminal guilt.155 Obviously a terrified onlooker is not to be punished
for his mere misfortune in having been present at the commission of a
felony.256 The next point is not so obvious since the law might require
a bystander to interfere in the effort to prevent a felony from being
perpetrated in his presence, if he could do so without unreasonable
danger to himself. Howeve-, this is not required under the present
law '57 unless the bystander owes some special duty of protection to the
149. Skidmore v. State, go Neb. 698, 700, 15 N. W. 288, 289 (i9o8). See also
Crow v. State, 19o Ark. 222, 79 S. W. (2d) 75 (I935).
i5o. State v. Berger, 121 Iowa 581, 96 N. W. 1094 (19o3); Clark v. Common-
wealth, 269 Ky. 833, 1O8 S. W. (2d) 1036 (937) ; State v. Young, 67 N. J. L. 223, 51
At!. 939 (1902).
I5I. State v. Chastain, 104 N. C. 900, io S. E. 5i9 (1889)..
152. State v. Killian, 178 N. C. 753, 101 S. E. 1O9 (1919) ; State v. Weekley, 40
Wyo. 162, 275 Pac. 122 (1929).
153. State v. Hamilton and Laurie, 13 Nev. 386 0I878).
I. Gambrell v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 620, 139 S. W. (2d) 454 (1940); State
v. Farr, 33 Iowa 553 (187); State v. Odbur, 317 Mo. 372, 295 S. W. 734 (927);
Walrath v. State, 8 Neb. 8o (1878) ; Gillard v. State, 128 Tex. Cr. R. 514, 82 S. W.
(2d) 678 (1935); Creasy v. Commonwealth, I66 Va. 721, 186 S. E. 63 (1936).
155. Under the early common law one who was present at the commission of a
felony was guilty of a misdemeanor if he did not "use means to apprehend the felon."
x HALE P. C. *439. See id. at pp. *448-9, *593. But even this was presence plus the
omission to take steps to apprehend a known felon, and it did not make him a party to
the crime.
:56. Commonwealth v. Loomis, 267 Pa. 438,444, rio Atl. 257 (1920).
157. People v. Woodward, 45 Cal. 293 (1873); Levering v. Commonwealth, 132
K y. 666, 117 S. W. 243 (9og) ; State v. Hildreth, 31 N. C. 44o (1849) ; Burrell v. State,
I Wis. 159 (1853) ; Connaughty v. State, i Wis. 159 (1853).
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intended victim.""8 In the words of the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina:
"Every person may, upon such an occasion, interfere to pre-
vent, if he can, the perpetration of so high a crime; but he is not
bound to do so at the peril, otherwise, of partaking of the guilt.
It is necessary, in order to have that effect, that he should do or
say something showing his consent to the felonious purpose and
contributing to its execution, as an aider and abettor." 159
Even the secret acquiescence or approval of the bystander is not suffi-
cient to taint him with guilt of the crime.1 0
One may be guilty, as a principal in the second degree, of a felony
committed by another in his presence although there has been no pre-
arrangement or previous understanding between the two; 101 but unless
he contributes actual aid it is necessary that his approval should be
"manifested by some word or act, in such a way that it operated on the
mind of" the perpetrator.1 2  This is entirely logical. The bystander's
approval of the felonious deed, or even his intent to offer physical
assistance if necessary, can not encourage the perpetrator in any man-
ner if it is unknown to him, and hence it makes no contribution to the
actual crime itself.163 It is quite otherwise if the bystander contributes
actual physical aid to the accomplishment of the prohibited result. This
will render him guilty (assuming mens rea on his part) even if the
perpetrator is quite unaware of the assistance at the time.16 4
Aid or encouragement to another who is actually perpetrating a
felony will not make the aider or encourager guilty of the crime if it
is rendered without mens rea. It is without mens rea if the giver does
not know or have reason to know of the criminal intention of the
other; 160 or if it is used as a mere pretension, for the purpose of hav-
ing evidence sufficient to convict the real offender,16 6 assuming this can
be accomplished without irreparable harm. For guilt as principal in
158. Rex v. Russell, [1933] Vict. L. R. 59 (1932); People v. Chapman, 62 Mich.
280,28 N. W. 896 (i886).
159. State v. Powell, 168 N. C. 134, 140, 83 S. E. 3Io (1914).
i6o. State v. Douglass, 44 Kan. 618, 26 Pac. 476 (i89o) ; True v. Commonwealth,
go Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684 (189o) ; State v. Odbur, 317 Mo. 372, 295 S. W. 734 (927) ;
State v. Mathis, 129 S. W. (2d) 20 (Mo. App. 1939) ; Smith v. State, 66 Okla. Cr. R.
408, 92 P. (2d) 582 (1939); Anderson v. State, 66 Okla. Cr. R. 291, 91 P. (2d) 794
(1939).
i16 . Harris v. State, 177 Ala. 17, 59 So. 205 (1913); State v. Lord, 42 N. M. 638,
84 P. (2d) 8o (1938) ; Espy v. State, 54 Wyo. 291, 92 P. (2d) 549 (1939).
162. Harper v. State, 83 Miss. 402, 410, 35 So. 572 (1903).
163. Hicks v. United States, I5o U. S. 442 (1893).
164. Way v. State, 155 Ala. 52, 46 So. 273 (19o8) ; Commonwealth v. Kern, i
Brewst. 350 (Pa. 1867).
165. Anderson v. State, 66 Okla. Cr. R. 291, 9L P. (2d) 794 (i939) ; Mowery v.
State, 132 Tex. Cr. R. 408, lO5 S. W. (2d) 239 (937).
166. Price v. People, io9 Ill. iog (1884) ; People v. Noelke, 29 Hun 461 (N. Y.
1883) ; Wright v. State, 7 Tex. App. 574 (1880).
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the second degree it is necessary that the acts or words of encourage-
ment be employed with that intent, 1 67 unless the offense is one for which
no more than criminal negligence is required. 0 S In general it is the
abettor's state of mind rather than the state of mind of the perpetrator
which determines the abettor's guilt or innocence, 169 except that he is
chargeable even with a specific intent if he gives his aid or encourage-
ment knowing the other is acting with such an intent. 170 If the charge
is first degree murder based upon an alleged deliberate and premeditated
killing, the abettor is not guilty of this degree of the crime unless he
either acted upon a premeditated design to cause the death of the
deceased or knew that the perpetrator was acting with such an intent, 71
and the same may be said of assault with intent to kill.'1 2  A person
who hands a loaded firearm to one of two engaged in a violent quarrel
is guilty of assault with intent to murder if such an assault results
from this abetment. 17 3  In this connection, it is to be borne in mind
that "intention" includes not only the purpose in mind but also such
results as are known to be substantially certain to follow.'
74
Counsel, command or encouragement to commit a crime may be
countermanded by the inciter or abettor so as to relieve him from crim-
inal responsibility for subsequent acts of the perpetrator 175 if the
countermand is duly communicated to the latter in time to enable him
to govern his action thereby. 76  On the other hand, if the act of incite-
ment or abetment has gone beyond mere words or gestures, an effective
undoing of what has been done may be prerequisite to exculpation.
For example, a man stepped up to a woman who was "cussing and
fussing" with others, handed her his gun, and told her to "go ahead
and kill them all." The man was held guilty as a principal in the sec-
ond degree because of a homicide then and there committed by the
woman, although he changed his mind after giving her the weapon and
made an ineffective effort to disarm her.
1 77
167. Hicks v. United States, i5o U. S. 442 (1893) ; Fudge v. State, 148 Ga. 149,
95 S. E. 98o (1918).
i68. Where the charge was manslaughter based upon death resulting from an un-
lawful race on the highway it seems the incitement of the one and the fatal act of the
other were both criminally negligent rather than intentional. Regina v. Swindall and
Osborne, 2 Car. & K. 230, 175 Eng. Rep. R. 95 (1846).
i69. State v. Lord, 42 N. M. 638, 84 P. (2d) 8o (1938).
17o. Tanner v. State, 92 Ala. i, 9 So. 613 (i89o) ; Woolbright v. State, 124 Ark.
197, 187 S. W. i66 (i916).
171. Savage v. State, i8 Fla. 909 (1882).
172. State v. Hickam, 95 Mo. 322, 8 S. W. 252 (1888) ; Mayhem v. State, 7o Vt.
I, 39 Atl. 477 (1896).
173. Harmon v. State, i66 Ala. 28, 52 So. 348 (gIo).
174. RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1934) § 13, comment d.
175. I HALF P. C. *436, *617-8; Rex v. Richardson, I Leach 387, 168 Eng. Rep.
R. 296 (0785).
176. Wilson v. United States, 5 Indian Ter. 6io, 82 . W. 924 (1904) ; People v.
King, 30 Cal. App. (2d) i85, 85 P. (2d) 928 (1938).
177. McCoy v. State, 5o Ga. App. 54, 176 S. E. 912 (i934).
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C. Accessory Before the Fact
An accessory before the fact is one who is guilty of felony by rea-
son of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the com-
mission thereof, without having been present either actually or con-
structively at the moment of perpetration." He is one who meets
every requirement of a principal in the second degree except that of
presence at the time. This makes it possible to include here by refer-
ence everything said above relative to such matters as (i) constructive
presence, (2) what constitutes counsel, command or encouragement,
as well as the need of communication to the perpetrator and the modes
of such communication, (3) the requirement of mens rea, and (4) the
possibility and limitations of countermand. Attention here may at
once be directed to other matters.
The accessory before the fact is unable to render aid at the actual
moment of perpetration, because anyone in such a position is held to be
constructively present and therefore a principal. But he may render
aid in advance, as by procuring for the perpetrator the weapon or other
means by which the felony is to be committed.1 79 The element of time
requires special mrention here, but this is only to emphasize the want
of any legally established time limit within which the accessory's incite-
ment may be recognized. It is no ground of immunity to him, for
example, that his counsel and advice were given more than a year prior
to the perpetration of the crime. 180 It is also possible for encourage-
ment or persuasion to be recognized even where negotiations are con-
ducted through an agent or representative.' 8 ' And one may be guilty
as accessory where the crime resulted from his incitement to engage in
certain kinds of criminal activity although his instructions were general
rather than special. Thus one who headed a conspiracy to commit rob-
beries, equipped confederates with supplies and weapons, suggested
prospective victims and shared in the spoils, is guilty of a robbery per-
petrated by his associates even though he had not given them the name
of this particular victim.'
82
One who incites the commission of a crime is guilty even if the
perpetrator varies the method of perpetration, as where the counsel or
command was to poison the victim and the perpetrator resorted to
178. I HALE P. C. *615; 4 Bi. CoMM. *35; People v. Suddeth, 28 N. E. (2d) 268
(Ill. 1940); Workman v. State, 23 N. E. (2d) 419 (Ind. 1939); Wimpling v. State,
171 Md. 362, 189 Atl. 248 (1937); Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349, 19
N. E. (2d) 62 (1939) ; State v. Farne, 190 S. C. 75, I S. E. (2d) 912 (1939). Pres-
ence, actual or constructive, is the determining factor in the distinction between prin-
cipal in the first degree and accessory before the fact. Duke v. State, 137 Fla. 513, 188
So. 124 (1939).
179. 2 COKE INST. 182; I HALE P. C. *616.
18o. Workman v. State, 21 N. E. (2d) 712 (Ind. 1939).
181. People v. Wright, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 197, 79 P. (2d) io2 (1938).
182. Breaz v. State, 214 Ind. 31, 13 N. E. (2d) 952 (1938).
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stabbing or shooting.18 3 He is also guilty of all incidental consequences
which might reasonably be expected to result from the intended
wrong, 184 as where robbery, or attempted robbery results in the death
of the victim. 1 85 But he is not guilty of a crime committed by the per-
petrator which is entirely other than the one incited and not an inci-
dental result thereof, as where the incitement was to commit arson and
the perpetrator committed robbery.' 80
A special problem, dealt with here because factually the resulting
crime is usually not in the presence of the one under consideration,
arises when one conducting an ordinarily lawful business in the usual
manner surmises that the other intends an unlawful use of the property
or service being offered. Must such a one forego the profit of this
transaction at the risk of being held a party to the crime if the sur-
mise proves correct? The consideration will not be limited to acces-
sories in the technical sense because the possibilities include treason and
misdemeanor as well as felony.
The solution of this problem is found, not in logical abstractions,
but in the effort to make a proper adjustment between conflicting social
interests. To whatever extent an affirmative answer is given, there will
be some restraint on lawful business, because, at times, an illegal use
will be erroneously expected. Furthermore, if an affirmative answer
should be given without limitation a merchant might find it necessary
to probe rather deeply into his customer's intentions to safeguard him-
self against the possibility of conviction resulting from the jury's mis-
take. On the other side, of course, is the social interest in the pre-
vention of crime. Hence the tendency has been to dispose of these
cases as follows: 187 the gravity of the social harm resulting from the
unlawful conduct is used to determine whether mere knowledge of the
intended use will be sufficient to carry the taint of illegality. 18 8 A seller
who completes the sale of goods after correctly divining that the pur-
chaser is buying them as an agent of an armed combination attempting
to overthrow the government, thereby "voluntarily aids the treason". 18
Furthermore, "no man ought to furnish another .with the means of
183. 2 HAWK. P. C. c. 29, §2o; 4 BL. ComiM. *38.
184. 4 BL. COMM. *37; People v. King, 3o Cal. App. (2d) 185, 85 P. (2d) 928
(1938); Workman v. State, 21 N. E. (2d) 712 (Ind. 1939).
185. 2 HAIwK. P. C. c. 29, § 18.
186. 4 BL. CoMM. *37.
187. Many of the cases are civil suits for the price of the thing sold or the service
rendered, but as correctly stated obiter in an Indiana case, "where the act of selling is
under such circumstances as would make the seller an accessory before the crime, he
cannot recover from the buyer the purchase money of the thing so sold." Bickel v.
Sheets, 24 Ind. I, 6 (1865).
188. Steele v. Curle, 34 Ky. 381, 387 (1836).
i89. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U. S. 342, 347 (1870) ; cf. Tatum v. Kelly, 25 Ark. 2o9
(1868) ; Roquemore v. Alloway, 33 Tex. 461 (187o).
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transgressing the law" 190 to the extent of committing murder or other
heinous crime. But the mere knowledge of one party to a transaction
that the other intends later to make an unlawful use of the property or
service involved, will not of itself be sufficient to taint that one with
the offense subsequently committed if it is of a relatively minor
nature.191 This has been applied in such cases as the following, in
which knowledge of the intent was held insufficient for guilt: sale of
liquor by an authorized dealer to a buyer who intended an unlawful
resale; 192 sale of innocent ingredients to one who intended to use them
in the unlawful manufacture of liquor; 193 sale of property purchased
to be used for the purpose of gaming; 114 sale of a dress to a prostitute
to be used in her "profession"; '95 the washing of clothes for a prosti-
tute for a similar use; 196 work and labor done and materials furnished
for a house to be used for gambling purposes; 197 transmittal of tele-
graph messages, innocent in themselves, to be used in maintaining a
gaming house; 198 installation of telephone apparatus and service in the
regular manner in a place to be used as a gaming house.' 99 It is other-
wise, even as to such an offense, if the one charged as an inciter has
not only had knowledge of the intended offense but has gone out of his
way to promote it,200 as by packing the goods sold in an unusual man-
ner to conceal their identity.2 01
Even offenders are not always accessories to separate offenses by
other wrongdoers with whom they have dealt with knowledge of the
unlawful intent.
20 2
i9o. Lightfoot v. Tenant, x Bos. & Pul. 551, 556, 126 Eng. Rep. R. 1059 (,796).
191. Partson v. United States, 2o F. (2d) 127 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Parsons Oil
Co. v. Boyett, 44 Ark. 23o (884).
192. Hodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt. I81, 128 Eng. Rep. R. 656 (1813) ; Graves v.
Johnson, 179 Mass. 53, 58, 60 N. E. 383 (0go1) ; Hill v. Spear, 5o N. H. 253 (1870);
Kreiss v. Seligman, 8 Barb. 439 (N. Y. 185o).
193. Jacobs v. Danciger, 328 Mo. 458, 41 S. W. (2d) 389 (I931).
194. Bickel v. Sheets, 24 Ind. 1 (1865).
195. Bowry v. Bennett, i Camp. 348, 17o Eng. Rep. R. 98i (i8o8).
196. Lloyd v. Johnson, i Bos. & Pul. 340, 126 Eng. Rep. R. 939 (1798).
197. Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474 (1872).
198. Commonwealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 112 Ky. 355, 67 S. W. 59 (1901).
i99. State ex reL. Dooley v. Coleman, 126 Fla. 203, 170 So. 722 (1936).
2oo. Danovitz v. United States, 281 U. S. 389 (930) ; Zito v. United States, 64
F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) ; O'Bryan v. Fitzpatrick, 48 Ark. 487 (1886). See
also the statement of Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, i Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep.R. 1120 (1775).
201. Biggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454, ioo Eng. Rep. R. 673 (789); Clugas v.
Penaluna, 4 T. R. 466, oo Eng. Rep. R. 1122 (1791) ; Waymell v. Reed, 5 T. R. 599,
ioi Eng. Rep. R. 335 (1794); Fisher v. Lord, 63 N. H. 514 (1885).
2o2. A defendant who sold counterfeit bills to a second party, who sold the same
bills to a third person who was arrested while trying to pass them, all three having
knowledge of the counterfeit nature of the bills, was not an accessory to the third per-
son's possession, since the defendant's connection with the bills ended when he received
his money from the second party, who might dispose of them as he chose. United
States v. Peoni, oo F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
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D. Accessory After the Fact
The accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge of the
other's guilt, renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his
detection, arrest, trial or punishment. 20 3  There are four requisites:
(i) A felony must have been committed by another, and it must have
been completed prior to the act of accessoryship, 20 4 although it is not
necessary that a formal charge shall have been filed against the prin-
cipal felon before this time; 205 (2) the accessory must not himself be
guilty of that felony as a principal; 200 (3) he must do some act to
assist the felon personally in his effort to avoid the consequences of
his crime; 207 and (4). this assistance must be rendered with guilty
knowledge of the felony.20 8 The ancient phrase used to describe the
act of accessoryship after the fact is: "where a person knowing the
felony to be committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts, or
assists the felon," 209 but it was recognized even in the very early law
that comfort or assistance which had no tendency to frustrate the due
course of justice was not included. 210 The more accurate statement, in
the absence of legislative enlargement of the field, 21 1 is: "An accessory
after the fact is one who, knowing a felony to have been committed by
another, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon in order to
hinder the felon's apprehension, trial, or punishment." 212 One does
not become an accessory after the fact merely by failing to arrest a
203. I HALE P. C. *618; 4 Bi. Comm. *37; Whorley v. State, 45 Fla. 123, 33 So.
849 (19o3) ; State v. Wells, 197 So. 419 (La. 194o).
204. 4 BL. Comm. *38; State v. Tollett, 173 Tenn. 447, 121 S. W. (2d) 525 (938).
One who knowingly renders aid to help a murderer to escape, after the mortal blow
is struck but before the deceased is dead (even if he dies shortly thereafter) cannot
properly be convicted under an indictment charging him as accessory after the fact.
Harrell v. State, 39 Miss. 702 (I861).
2o5. State v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5, 120 S. W. 154 (igo9) ; Howard v. People, 97 Colo.
550, 51 P. (2d) 594 (1935) ; Hayden v. State, 114 Neb. 783, 21o N. W. 165 (1926).
But cf. People v. Garnett, 129 Cal. 364, 61 Pac. 1114 (1900) (under special statute).
206. Crosby v. State, 179 Miss. 149, 175 So. 18o (1937) ; People v. Chadwick, 7
Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737 (89).
207. 4 BL. Comm. *37-8; Wren v. Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. 952, 956 (Va. 1875).
208. Ibid.; Jaso v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. R. 229, 97 S. W. (2d) 696 (1936).
209. I HALE P. C. *618. See also 4 BL. CoMm. *37; Wren v. Commonwealth, 26
Gratt. 952, 956 (Va. 1875).
21o. I HALE P. C. *62o; Jones v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. R. 146, 128 S. W. (2d) 8o3
(1939).
211. As an example of such extension, see Howard v. People, 97 Colo. 550, 51 P.
(2d) 594 (1935).
212. Skelly v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 483, 487 (C. C. A. ioth, 1935), cert. denied,
295 U. S. 757 (1935).
"Before one can be convicted as an accessory to a crime actually committed by an-
other . . . [after the fact] it must be shown with reasonable certainty both that he
knew such other had committed the crime, and also that in what the accused did he
proposed, to some extent at least, to conceal the offender or give him aid in order that
he might evade arrest or trial, or the execution of his sentence. . . ."1 Jaso v. State,
13I Tex. Cr. R. 229, 97 S. W. (2d) 696 (1936).
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known felon 213 or to disclose a known felony.2 14  Even compounding
a felony, although punishable as such,2 15. does not render the com-
pounder guilty of that felony as accessory after the fact,2 16 although
the very ancient rule was otherwise.
21 7
"As to the receiving, relieving or assisting, one known to be
a felon, it may be said in general terms, that any assistance given
to one known to be a felon in order to hinder his apprehension,
trial or punishment, is sufficient to make a man an accessory after
the fact; as that he concealed him in the house, or shut the door
against the pursuers, until he should have an opportunity to
escape; or took money from him to allow him to escape; or sup-
plied him with money, a horse or other necessities, in order to
enable him to escape; or that the principal was in prison, and the
jailer was bribed to let him escape; or conveyed instruments to
him to enable him to break prison and escape. This and such like
assistance to one known to be a felon, would constitute a man
accessory after the fact." 218
One may be guilty as accessory after the fact by throwing suspi-
cion away from the principal by swearing falsely at the coroner's
inquest,219 or by concealing the evidence in a homicide case by secreting
the corpse.22 0  One who performs a surgical operation upon a fugitive
from justice for the purpose of obliterating his finger prints and alter-
ing his facial expression to enable him to evade arrest has been held
guilty of conspiring to conceal him in violation of the federal statute 221
and would seem to be an accessory after the fact in the absence of any
special enactment.
One who is an accessory before the fact may also become an acces-
sory to the same offense after the fact,222 but this is not true of one
213. I HA=E P. C. *618.
214. Levering v. Commonwealth, 132 ICy. 666, 117 S. W. 253 (19o9).
Some statutes provide that anyone who, after knowledge that a felony has been
committed, conceals it from a magistrate, or harbors and protects the person who com-
mitted it, is an accessory after the fact. State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P. (2d) 458
(1937).
"But we are of opinion that the word 'conceal', as here used in our statute, implies
some act or refusal to act by which it is intended to prevent or hinder the discovery
of the crime; that a mere failure to give information is not enough." Davis v. State, 96
Neb. 7, 13 (19IO). See also United States v. Shapiro, IX3 F. (2d) 89i (C. C. A. 2d,
1940).
215. 4 BL. COMM. *133-4.
216. Ibid.
217. Ibid. See also I HAwx. P. C. c. 59, § 6.
218. Wren v. Commonwealth, 26 Gratt. 952, 956-7 (Va. 1875). Surreptitiously re-
storing to its original position the weapon used to commit the felony, or burning over-
alls used by the felon are facts admissible in evidence on such an issue. Crosby v. State,
179 Miss. 149, 175 So. 18o (1937).
219. Blakely v. State, 24 Tex. Cr. R. 616, 7 S. W..233 (i888).
22o. People v. Farmer, 196 N. Y. 65, 89 N. E. 462 (1gog).
221. Piquett v. United States, 8i F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 298
U. S. 664 (1936).
222. Rex v. Blackson, 8 C. & P. 43, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 391 (1837) ; Springer v.
State, io2 Ga. 447, 3o S. E. 971 (1897).
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who is guilty as a principal felon.223  On the other hand, absence at the
time of perpetration is not essential in the case of an accessory after
the fact. For example, one who was present at the time a murder was
committed, without abetting the felony in any way, but who thereafter,
with guilty knowledge, assisted in concealing the evidence of the crime
in order to protect the principal from prosecution, was guilty as an
accessory after the fact.224
Under the common law rule a wife cannot be accessory after the
fact by reason of having concealed her husband or given him other
assistance, knowing him to be a felon, but this does not apply to the
husband who renders such assistance to his wife, nor to others such
as parents or children. 225  The exception has been extended somewhat
liberally by some of the modern statutes.
2 2 6
IV. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
A. Under the Common Law
The limitation of the principal-accessory distinction to felony
cases offers a clue to its origin. There was no dissatisfaction with the
common law penalty for either treason or misdemeanor. The death
penalty was thought to be quite appropriate for treason, and much
milder penalties were provided for misdemeanor cases. On the other
hand, there came to be great dissatisfaction with the rule applying the
death penalty in all felony cases, particularly after the little group of
felonies had been greatly enlarged by statutory additions. This dis-
satisfaction led to the invention of various devices for the purpose of
avoiding an excessive number of executions in felony cases, as, for
example, benefit of clergy 227 and the doctrine of coercion. 228  Without
doubt, the principal-accessory distinction was one of these devices, and
because of this it is not surprising to find the development along lines
which tended to prevent conviction in spite of clear evidence of guilt.
229
The technicalities tending to this result made their appearance in four
different connections and may be grouped under the heads of (i) jur-
isdiction, (2) pleading, (3) trial and (4) degree of guilt.
A consideration of these problems of the principal-accessory dis-
tinction may well be prefaced by brief mention of felony cases which
223. "One who is a principal cannot be an accessory after the fact." People v.
Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 138, 25 Pac. 737, 738 (i8gI).
224. White v. People, 81 Ill. 333 (1876).
225. 4 BL COMM. *38-9.
226. E. g., 9 MAss. LAws ANN. (933) c. 274, § 4.
227. I STEPHEN, HIsTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 461.
228. 2 LEwIN C. C. 232 n.
29". . . distinctions between accessories and principals rest solely in authority,
being without foundation either in natural reason or the ordinary doctrine of law; for
the general rule of law is that what one does through another's agency is to be regarded
as done by himself." Carlisle v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 537, 546, 21 S. W. 358, 359 (1893).
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concern several guilty parties who are all principals. The difficulties
held to be so insurmountable in cases involving accessories do not arise
at all if the guilty parties are all principals, even if they are principals
of different degrees. The problem of jurisdiction cannot arise in a
form similar to that of the accessory cases. The common law theory
of criminal jurisdiction is that the place of trial depends upon the situs
of the offense,23 0 and since the principal in the second degree is always
present, constructively if not actually, his abetment is in legal theory at
the same place as the perpetration by the principal in the first degree.
Hence, the court having jurisdiction over one principal will also have
jurisdiction over the other.231  It is not necessary for the pleading to
disclose whether the defendant is a principal in one degree or the
other.232  A principal in the second degree may be charged in the indict-
ment either as having committed the felony or as having been present
aiding and abetting another in the commission thereof,
2 33 and if the
indictment specifically charges one as the perpetrator and the other as
the abettor, both may be convicted although the proof establishes that
the one charged as abettor was in fact the perpetrator, while the other
was present aiding and abetting him.23 4  With reference to trial, the
principal in the second degree may be tried and convicted prior to the
trial of the principal in the first degree, 235 or even after the latter has
been tried and acquitted.2 36  Furthermore, a principal in the second
degree may be convicted of a higher degree of guilt than the principal
230. Connor v. State, 29 Fla. 455, 30 So. 89, (1892) ; Sweat v. State, go Ga. 315,
17 S. E. 273 (1892). Other systems may give primary importance to personal juris-
diction, see the French CoDE D'INSTRUCTION CIMINELIE, Art. 5. Statutes may pro-
vide criminal jurisdiction on this basis, see U. S. CL_ CODE, § i.
231. State v. Hamilton and Laurie, 13 Nev. 386 (x878).
232. Adkins v. State, 187 Ga. 519, 1 S. E. (2d) 420 (1939) ; Nelson v. State, 1387
Ga. 576, 1 S. E. (2d) 641 (3939) ; Walrath v. State, 8 Neb. 8o (1878) ; State v. Ochoa,
41 N. M. 589, 72 P. (2d) 6og (1937).
233. Regina v. Crisham, C. & M. 188, 174 Eng. Rep. R. 466 (3843); Screws v.
State, 188 Ga. 678, 4 S. E. (2d) 6oi (939) ; McKinney v. Commonwealth, 143 S. W.
(2d) 745 (Ky. 1940). It has been said this would not apply in the rare situation in which
a different penalty was provided for the two types of principal. State v. Woodworth,
121 N. J. L. 78, 83, 1 A. (2d) 254 (1938). But the common law rule is otherwise
even in such a case. i EAST P. C. (3803) 348; Rex v. Stearne, 3 Leach 473, 168 Eng.
Rep. R. 338 (787).
234. 1 HALE P. C. *437-8; Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke 65b, 67b, 77 Eng. Rep. R. 828
(1611) ; Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98, io5, i6 So. 237 (934) ; Reed v. Common-
wealth, 125 Ky. 126, 1oo S. W. 856 (19o7).
235. 1 HALE P. C. *437; Regina v. Griffeth, I Pl. 97, 75 Eng. Rep. R. 152 (3553);
see McCall v. State, 12o Fla. 707, 719, 363 So. 38 (935).
236. Regina v. Wallis, i Salk. 334, 91 Eng. Rep. R. 294 (703); Rex v. Taylor,
i Leach C. L. 36o (3785) ; Rooney v. United States, 203 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913) ;
People v. Newberry, 2o Cal. 44o (1862) ; People v. Bearss, 3O Cal. 68 (1858) ; State
v. Lea, 91 Iowa 499, 6o N. W. 339 (1894) ; Christie v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 799,
237 S. W. 66o (1922); Reed v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 126, 100 S. W. 856 (19o7);
State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32 (3859) ; State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475 (1857); State v.
Ochoa, 41 N. M. 589, 72 P. (2d)' 6o (1937) ; State v. Martino, 27 N. M. x, 192 Pac.
507 (3920) ; State v. Whitt, 113 N. C. 716, i8 S. E. 715 (3893) ; Mitchell v. Common-
wealth, 33 Gratt. 845 (Va. i88o) ; see People v. Blackwood, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 728,
733, 96 P. (2d) 982 (1939). Contra: State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. R. 731, 25 So.
372 (1890).
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in the first degree.213 The former may be convicted of first degree
murder, for example, although the latter has been convicted of second
degree murder.238  Similarly, the former may be convicted of murder
although the latter has been convicted of manslaughter,2 39 since an
abettor may counsel with malice aforethought what the other perpe-
trates in the sudden heat of passion. 240  An abettor may be convicted
of felony even though the perpetrator has been convicted of misde-
meanor only.241 Needless to say, the abettor may be convicted of a
lower degree of crime than the perpetrator.
242
None of these problems can be answered so simply if an accessory
is involved. However, let us repeat that the involvement of an acces-
sory requires a felony case because "in misdemeanors and in treason,
all who take part in the crime are principals." 243
i. Jurisdiction
As previously mentioned the common law adopted the territorial
theory of criminal jurisdiction, by which the power to hear and deter-
mine a criminal case is dependent upon the situs of the offense. Thus
if one standing in North Carolina shoots across the boundary line into
the state of Tennessee and inflicts a fatal injury upon a person there,
the common law does not authorize a conviction of this murder in
North Carolina because, according to its view, the homicide is com-
mitted in Tennessee. 244  It is the same if a wrongdoer perpetrates a
felony at a distance through the act of an innocent agent,24 5 or if he
incites a guilty party to commit treason or a misdemeanor in another
jurisdiction.240  In all such cases the offense may be tried and punished
where the harm itself is done. But one who incites a guilty party to
perpetrate a felony in another jurisdiction is not punishable there, but
237. Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 217 (859) ; State v. Gray, 55 Kan. 135, 39 Pac. 1O5O
(1895) ; Red v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 667, 47 S. W. 1003 (I898).
238. Davis v. State, 152 Ind. 145, 52 N. E. 754 (1899) ; State v. Lee, 91 Ind. 499,
6o N. W. Ig (894).
239. 1 HALE P. C. *438; Bruce v. State, 99 Ga. 50, 25 S. E. 76o (1896) ; Goins v.
State, 46 Ohio St 457, 23 N. E. 476 (i88g).
240. I EAST P. C. *350.
241. Christie v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 799, 237 S. W. 660 (3922).
242. 4 Br. Comm. *36; People v. Blackwood, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 728, 96 P. (2d)
982 (939).
243. Regina v. Clayton, i Car. & Kir. 328, 174 Eng. Rep. R. 743 (3843).
244. State v. Hall, 334 N. C. 909, ig S. E. 6o2 (1894). The court suggested in
this case that this want of jurisdiction to try such an offense in the state in which the
offender stood at the time could be corrected by legislation. This is done in some juris-
dictions by a statute authorizing the punishment of one who commits a crime "in whole
or in part" within the state. See State v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 233, 64 Pac. 286 (igoi).
245. Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507 (3882).
246. Town of Barkhamsted v. Parsons, 3 Conn. 1 (18ig) ; i WHinAT0oN, Cim iNAL
LAW (12th ed. 3932) § 333.
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only where his act of accessoryship occurred.2 47 The same is true of
an accessory after the fact who guiltily renders aid to the felon in
another jurisdiction.
248
2. Pleading
The case may be lost in advance either by carelessness in the plead-
ing or by a mistaken notion as to whether the particular defendant was
or was not present at the time the crime was committed. One charged
with felony as a principal cannot be convicted if the evidence estab-
lishes accessorial guilt, 249 and one charged as an accessory cannot be
convicted if the evidence shows him to have been a principal.2 50  One
may be charged as a principal and as an accessory in separate counts
of the same indictment, 25' but the prosecution can be required to elect
upon which count it will rely before the case is finally submitted to the
jury.2 52 How nicely this operates in favor of the accused is disclosed by
the fact that while an acquittal of one charged as an accessory does not
bar a subsequent trial upon an indictment charging him as principal,2
53
he may be acquitted by both juries because of a doubt as to whether he
was or was not present at the time.
2 5 4
3. Trial
Where no change has been interposed by statute, an accessory,
unless he waives his right in this regard,2 55 cannot be tried before the
principal. 256  The two may be joined in the same indictment and tried
247. I HALE P. C. *623; State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561 (1856) ; People v. Hodges, 27
Cal. 340 (i865) ; State v. Wyckoff, 31 N. J. L. 65 (1864). It is sufficient if any act of
incitement was within the jurisdiction although the inciter left the state before the
felony was perpetrated. In re Malicord, 211 N. C. 684, 191 S. E. 730 (937). The
result stated in the text was reached by an English statute, i HALE P. C. *623, early
enough to be common law in this country; but it has been rejected in at least one state.
State v. Ayers, 67 Tenn. 96 (1874).
248. I HALE P. C. *623; Tully v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush 142 (Ky. 1877).
249. Smith v. State, 37 Ark. 274 (1881) ; Shelton v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. 18,
86 S. W. (2d) 1o54 (i935) ; Skidmore v. State, 8o Neb. 698, 115 N. W. 288 (igo8) ;
see Smith v. State, 56 Ga. App. 384, 192 S. E. 647 (i937) ; Workman v. State, 23 N. E.
(2d) 419 (Ind. 1939).
250. Regina v. Brown, 14 Cox C. C. 144 (1878). One charged as accessory after
the fact might be convicted although he was shown to be present at the time of the
felony if he was not tainted with guilt until after the crime was complete. White v.
People, 8I Ill. 333 (1876).
251. See Shelton v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. i8, 86 S. W. (2d) 1054 (I935).
252. Regina v. Brannon, 14 Cox C. C. 394 (I88O).
253. I HALE P. C. 625; 4 BL. Comm. *40. Hale states that acquittal as principal
does bar a subsequent prosecution as accessory before the fact, i HALE P. C. *625-6,
but it has been held not a bar. Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 297 Mass. 347, II N. E.(2d) 799 0I937).
254. To warrant a conviction the prosecution must prove its case "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." 9 WIGmOaE, EvIDENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2497.
255. If the accessory waives his right in this regard he may be tried before theprincipal, but if he is convicted it is necessary to respite judgment until the trial of the
principal because the subsequent acquittal of the latter would annul this conviction. i
HALE P. C. *623.
256. Ibid.; State v. Graham, 19o La. 669, 182 So. 711 (1938) ; see People v. Smith,
271 Mich. 553, 561, 26o N. W. 911 (1935).
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jointly,257 unless the accessory is entitled to a severance,258 but if they
are tried together the jury must be instructed to inquire first into the
guilt of the principal, and if they find him not guilty to acquit the acces-
sory forthwith; but if they find the principal guilty then to consider
whether or not the accessory is also guilty.259 Needless to add, an
acquittal of the principal bars a subsequent trial of the accessory. 260
The results of this aspect of the principal-accessory concept are
quite absurd. Anything which prevents conviction 26 1 of the principal
makes impossible the conviction of the accessory.26 2 Hence, if the prin-
cipal is never apprehended, 2 3 or if before the moment of conviction
he should die 264 or be pardoned,265 the accessory must go free although
his guilt may be well known and easy to prove. Furthermore, if both
are convicted in due course, but the conviction of the principal is there-
after reversed, the conviction of the accessory cannot stand.
266
A far-fetched corollary was that there could be no accessory to
manslaughter before the fact.2 7  The notion was that manslaughter is
unlawful homicide in the heat of sudden passion and hence could not
257. 1 HALE P. C. *623. See also Howard v. People, 97 Colo. 550, 553, 51 P. (2d)
594 (1935).
258. Many statutes authorize any joint defendant in a felony indictment to require
separate trials. See, for example, CODE OF IOWA (1939) § 13,842. Needless to say,
under such authorization either the accessory or the principal could require a severance.
259. 1 HALE P. C. *624.
260. Bowen v. State, 25 Fla. 645, 6 So. 459 (1889) ; see State v. Hess, 233 Wis. 4,
288 N. W. 275 (1939).
261. Hale says that pardon of the principal after he "be only convict" and before
attainder is a bar to the trial of the accessory. 1 HALE P. C. *625. Attainder resulted
from the sentence of death which was included in the judgment of conviction of felony.
In other words, it was not the establishment of guilt of the principal by plea or verdict
which was the magical event in this regard, but the judgment of conviction which was
entered thereon. It is in this sense, the correct one it is submitted, that the word "con-
viction" is used in the text.
Under the ancient law outlawry in treason and felony amounted to attainder. 2
HALE P. C. *205. Hence the original statements were to the effect that "the accessory
can not be brought to trial until the principal has been convicted or outlawed." 2 POL-
LOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (2d ed. 18g8) 5dg.
262. ". . . for if anything obstruct judgment . . . the accessory is to be dis-
charged." 1 HALE P. C. *625.
263. Anciently the fugitive felon could be reached by outlawry. See note 261
supra.
264. 1 HALE P. C. *625; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 422, 425 (1820);
State v. McDaniel, 41 Tex. 229 (1874).
265. I HALE P. C. *625; Rex v. Burridge, 3, P. Williams 439, 24 Eng. Rep. R. 1135
(735) ; State v. Duncan, 28 N. C. 98 (1845). 'See in a writ of error in the Common
Bench, that it was held by Thirning that in every case of felony, where a man is in-
dicted as a principal and afterwards has a charter of pardon, or else he abjures the
realm, the accessory, in that case, shall not be arraigned; for when the life of the prin-
cipal is pardoned by the law in whatever manner it may be, that felony is extinct in his
person, and consequently he is acquitted and for the same reason the accessory is ac-
quitted, etc. Query, if the principal resorts to his clergy." Anonymous, STRATrHAM'S
ABR. (Klingelsmith's translation) 420, pl. 33. In some of our jurisdictions the power
to pardon is restricted to "after conviction." See, e. g., Mo. CoNsT., Art. V, § 8. If
there can be no pardon before conviction this point will not arise.
266. Ray v. State, 13 Neb. 55, 1.3 N. W. 2 (1882). The party in this case was
accessory after the fact.
267. I HALE P. C. *615-6; 4 BL. Comm. *36.; Bibithe's Case, 4 Coke 43b, 76 Eng.
Rep. R. 991 (1597) ; see Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194 (855) ; Jones v. State, 13 Tex. 168
(1854).
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have been incited by one not present. If guilt of manslaughter is predi-
cated upon some other basis, such as criminal negligence, this reasoning
does not apply.268 But even in the case of voluntary manslaughter the
premise is not supported by fact. Under the rules of provocation and
the cooling time it would easily be possible for one of two who have
received great provocation from a third, to follow and kill the third,
at the command or suggestion of the second, before the passion had had
time to cool, although the fatal act was at such a distance from the
inciter that it could not be said to be in his presence. The modern
trend seems to be in the direction of recognizing an accessory before
the fact even in the case of voluntary manslaughter.269
More logical was the rule in cases of suicide. Malicious self-
destruction was recognized by the common law as "a peculiar species
of felony." 270 By the ancient law punishment was provided in the
form of ignominious burial and forfeiture of goods and chattels,271
upon a determination of guilt by the coroner's jury.272 Hence, one
who had incited the self-destruction of another could be convicted as
an accessory before the fact.2 73  Later, when a change of the punitive
system left no punishment available for the suicide, one who had coun-
seled, commanded or otherwise encouraged such an act of self-
destruction on the part of another, was held not subject to conviction if
he was not present at the time, because he was accessory before the
fact and the principal had not been convicted.27 4  If such a one was
present at the time he is convictable as a principal.2 7 5  For example,
where two, who have agreed to commit suicide, take poison for this
purpose, each in the presence of the other, but only one dies, the sur-
vivor is guilty of murderY.2 7  Because suicide is not punishable under
modern penal systems it is held, in some jurisdictions, not to be a
crime at all.2 7 7  There is some authority for holding the abettor of
suicide dispunishable where this view prevails, 278 although the better
268. State v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 2 N. E. (2d) 839 (1936) ; State v. McVay, 47
R. I. 292, 132 AtI. 436 (1926) ; see Wade v. State, 174 Tenn. 248, 251, 124 S. W. (2d)
710 (1939).
269. Thomas v. State, 73 Fla. 115, 74 So. 1 (917) ; Moore v. Lowe, 1I6 W. Va.165, 18o S. E. 1 (1935).
270. 4 BL. COMM. *189.
271. Id. at 19o; 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 227 at 1O5.
272. I HALE P. C. *415. If the body could not be seen the inquisition was by the
justices. Id. at 414-5.
273. Id. at 416; 4 B. CoMm. *189.
274. Regina v. Leddington, 9 Car. & P. 79, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 749 (1839); Regina
v. Fretwell, 9 Cox C. C. 152 (1862) ; Commonwealth v. Hicks, i18 Ky. 637, 82 S. W.
265 (1904).
275. Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816) ; State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378,
115 S. W. 998 (I9o9).
276. Regina v. Allison, 8 Car. & P. 418, 173 Eng. Rep. R. 557 (1838).
277. State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N. W. 717 (1934).
278. Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 193, 69 S. W. 529 (1902).
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rule is otherwise.2 79 Under some of the modern statutes abolishing the
distinction between principals and accessories even the absent inciter of
suicide has been held punishable.
2 0
4. Degree of Guilt
Under the original rule, "principals and accessories were felons,
and were, as such, punishable with death." 21 However, this was
modified at an early time to the extent of entitling accessories after the
fact to benefit of clergy even in cases in which principals and accessories
before the fact were excluded therefrom. 282  Ignoring this modifica-
tion, the authorities tended toward such generalizations as "that acces-
sories shall suffer the same punishment as their principals." 283 The
law in this regard might easily have taken a different turn, because it
was clearly recognized even in the time of Lord Hale that two who
jointly kill a third may have different degrees of guilt, because one may
act with malice aforethought and the other without.28 4  And as previ-
ously mentioned an abettor may be convicted of either a higher 285 or
a lower 288 degree of guilt than the perpetrator. With reference to the
inciter, however, the rule came to be that "an accessory cannot be
guilty of a higher crime than his principal." 287 The result of this
rule combined with the manslaughter rule previously mentioned, was,
at one time, that if either the principal 288 or the accessory 289 before
the fact was found guilty of manslaughter, no judgment of conviction
could be entered against the accessory. This is largely a matter of
history because the present trend is to recognize that one may be acces-
sory to manslaughter before the fact.
2 90
The rule that an accessory should not be convicted of a higher
crime than his principal was based on the notion that the former should
never suffer more punishment than the latter. This has been carried
to such an extent that if the principal is a corporation the penalty to be
279. Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N. E. 505 (i9o3) ; People v. Roberts, 211
Mich. 187, 178 N. W. 690 (1920).
280. McMahan v. State, I68 Ala. 7o, 53 So. 89 (i9io); Commonwealth v. Hicks,
118 Ky. 637, 82 S. W. 265 (1904). -
281. 2 STEPHEN, op. cit. mpra note 227 at 231.
282. Id. at 232; 4 BL. CoMM. *39.
283. 4 BL. COMM. *39; People v. McArdle, 295 Ill. 149, 14 N. E. (2d) 683 (1938).
284. i HALE P. C. *438.
285. 4 BL. COMM. *36; Bingham v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 688, 210 S. W. 459
(gig). The abettor was guilty of murder and the perpetrator of manslaughter.
286. Brown v. State, 28 Ga. igg (I859) ; Speer v. State, 52 Ga. App. 209, 182 S. E.
824 (935). The abettor was guilty of manslaughter and the perpetrator of murder.
287. 4 BL. CoMM. *36.
288. i HALE P. C. *437, *616.
289. State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 349, 41 Pac. 5i (1895).
290. Moore v. Lowe, ii6 W. Va. i65, i8o S. E. I (1935).
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inflicted upon the accessory must be limited to a fine, since the corpora-
tion cannot be punished by imprisonment.2 91
Since the common law distinction was between principals on the
one hand and accessories on the other, the technical embarrassments to
the prosecution which have just been mentioned apply to the accessory
after the fact,292 as well as to the accessory before, except that the pos-
sibility of an accessory to manslaughter after the fact seems to have
been recognized from the first.293 An additional difficulty, however, is
involved in the prosecution of an accessory of the latter type. The
origin of this technicality is the rule that one cannot be an accessory
after the fact if his guilty conduct did not occur after the commission
of the felony itself.294  In ordinary circumstances, this rule works
well enough, because one whose guilty aid was rendered before the
completion of the felony is usually a principal in the second degree or
an accessory before the fact, depending upon whether he was present
or absent at the time. But the rule has been given an extreme applica-
tion in certain situations such as the homicide cases. In these cases, one
who, with full knowledge of the facts, aided in the concealment or
escape of a murderer after the mortal blow was struck but before the
death of the victim, was held not to be an accessory to murder."'
On the other hand, no indictment or other formal charge against the
principal, at the time aid is given him, is required to constitute the
aider an accessory after the fact. This result has been reached even
under statutes which refer to the principal as the person "charged with
or found guilty of the crime". 296  There is, however, authority for the
opposite conclusion on this point.
29
7
291. People v. Duncan, 363 Ill. 495, 2 N. E. (2d) 705 (1936) ; People v. McArdle,
295 Ill. App. 149, 14 N. E. (2d) 683 (1938).
292. Hale, for example, deals first with what constitutes accessoryship before the
fact, then what constitutes accessoryship after the fact, and lastly the procedural prob-
lems involved. i HALE P. C. *612-626. The accessory after the fact is triable where
his act of accessoryship took place rather than where the felony was committed. Id.
at 623. One charged as a principal cannot be convicted as accessory after the fact.
Reynolds v. People, 83 Ill. 479 (1876). But the acquittal of one charged as a principal
is not a bar to a subsequent indictment against him as an accessory after the fact, and
vice versa. Ibid. Such an accessory, unless he waives his rights in this regard cannot
be tried until the principal is convicted. Id. at 623. And a conviction based upon such
a waiver is annulled if the principal is subsequently acquitted. Ibid.
293. I HALE P. C. *616; State v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284, 28 S. E. 937 (1897).
294. Hightower v. State, 78 Tex. Cr. R. 6o6, i82 S. W. 492 (1916) ; Gonzales v.
State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 458, 171 S. W. i146 (1914); see Roberts v. People, 1o3 Colo.
250, 87 P. (2d) 251 (1938).
295. Harrell v. State, 39 Miss. 702 (1861). Assault with intent to kill was a
felony by statute and hence the aider was held to be accessory to that felony after the
fact. But at common law he would not have been punishable at all because the assault,
as such, even with this intent, was only a misdemeanor. Hence a verdict of not guilty
was directed in the case of a defendant who helped a murderer to escape after the
mortal blow but before the death of the victim. Commonweatlh v. Costa, 2 D. & C. 612(Pa. 1922).
296. State v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5, 120 S. W. 154 (199o).
297. People v. Garnett, z29 Cal. 364, 61 Pac. 1114 (9oo).
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B. Statutory Changes
Since the reason for the principal-accessory distinction ceased to
exist when most of the felonies were removed from the category of
capital crimes, the distinction itself should be abrogated, and the legis-
lative trend has long been in this direction.298  Probably no jurisdic-
tion retains the common law of accessories untouched by legislative
change. However, statutes have been variously worded and have
received different types of interpretation. It is grave error to assume
that this common law distinction with all of its consequences has com-
pletely disappeared from the country as a whole. For example, under
variously worded statutes intended to improve the administration of
justice by changes in this field we find in certain jurisdictions such
conclusions as these: Under a statute expressly authorizing an acces-
sory before the fact to be tried either in the county in which his act of
accessoryship occurred or in the county in which the felony was per-
petrated, the accessory is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal if it
is shown that all of his acts of accessoryship were performed beyond
the boundaries of the state.299 A statute authorizing trial of the acces-
sory "although the principal offender may not have been arrested and
tried" does not permit the trial of the accessory before that of the prin-
cipal if the principal is in custody and his case ready for trial.300 A
statute directing the accessory before the fact to be indicted and tried
as a principal does not permit the trial of the accessory if the principal
has been acquitted. 301 A statute authorizing trial of the accessory
whether the principal has been convicted or not does not authorize the
trial of the accessory if the principal has been tried and acquitted.302
And a statute authorizing an accessory before the fact to be considered
a principal and punished accordingly does not permit the inciter to be
punished more severely than the perpetrator.30 3  Again, where certain
of the common law technicalities have been removed by statute it is
still impossible to convict one indicted as having committed the crime
298. See, e. g., Griffith v. State, go Ala. 583, 8 So. 8I2 (i89o) ; State v. Bums, 82
Conn. 213, 218, 72 AtI. IO85 (igog) ; State v. Bogue, 52 Kan. 79, 34 Pac. 410 (893) ;
Fleming v. State, i42 Miss. 872, 1o8 So. 143 (1926) ; In re Resler, 115 Neb. 335, 341,
212 N. W. 765, 768 (1927) ; People v. Beintner, i68 N. Y. S. 945 (I918). One statute
has extended it to include cases of misdemeanor. State v. Shapiro, 29 R. I. 133, 6) AtI.
340 (I9O8).
299. State v. Sigh, 38 Del. 362, 192 AtI. 682 (937) ; cf. State v. Tollett, x73 Tenn.
447, 121 S. W. (2d) 525 (1938).
300. Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. I65, 299 S. W. 737 (1927).
301. State v. St. Philip, i69 La. 468, 125 So. 451 (1929).
302. People v. Wyherk, 347 Il1. 28, 178 N. E. 89o (i93i); McCarty v. State, 44
Ind. 214 (1873) ; Pierce v. State, 13o Tenn. 24, 164 S. W. 851 (94).
303. People v. Duncan, 363 Ill. 495, 2 N. E. (2d) 705 (1936) ; People v. McArdle,
295 Ill. App. I49, 14 N. E. (2d) 683 (938); cf. Neumann v. State, ii6 Fla. 98, 156
So. 237 (I934).
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and proved to have incited it as an accessory before the fact; 304 or to
convict one charged as a principal in the second degree and proved to
be accessory before the fact,305 or charged as accessory before the fact
and proved to be a principal in the second degree.30 6
The statements in the preceding paragraph, let it be emphasized,
represent merely the conclusions of a few courts under particular stat-
utes. Some of them are quite unsound even as a matter of statutory
construction, but no attempt will be made here to apportion the blame
between the legislatures and the courts. By some of the statutes "the
distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal is abro-
gated," 307 and in such a jurisdiction it has been said: "No man can
now be an accessory to a felony committed here, 'he is a principal or
nothing.' "30s Some of the other enactments are worded quite differ-
ently 309 It is proper to say that almost 310 everywhere the unavail-
ability of the principal has ceased to be a bar to the conviction of the
accessory before the fact.311 Beyond this, generalizations are haz-
ardous. A comparative study of the various enactments and the differ-
erent interpretations of each type is quite beyond the scope of the pres-
ent effort, but brief mention may be made of results achieved by well
worded statutes liberally interpreted.
It has been held, under legislative authority deemed sufficient for
such changes, that the accessory may be tried and punished in the jur-
isdiction in which the felony was perpetrated, although he himself
remained beyond its borders until afterwards; 3 1 2 that the indictment
need not state whether the defendant was an accessory or a princi-
pal; 3' that the accessory may be prosecuted although the principal has
3o4. Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98, 156 So. 237 (1934) ; Smith v. State, 56 Ga.
App. 384, 192 S. E. 647 (1937) ; State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84 (848) ; Edwards v. State,
174 Tenn. 532, 128 S. W. (2d) 629 (1939); State v. Gifford, 19 Wash. 464, 53 Pac.
7o9 (1898) ; Karakutza v. State, 163 Wis. 293, I56 N. W. 965 (1916).
305. Shelton v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. 18, 86 S. W. (2d) 1O54 (935).
3o6. Penny v. State, 14o Fla. 155, 191 So. 190 (1939).
307. IOWA CODE (1939) § 12895; OKLA. STAT. (93) § 2902.
3o8. State v. Bums, 82 Conn. 213, 218, 72 Atl. lO83, lo85 (igog); cf. State v. Gif-
ford, i Wash. 464, 53 Pac. 709 (1898).
3o9. See, e. g., LA. CODE OF CR. PRO. (1932) art. 238; MAss. ANN. LAWS (1933)
V. 9, C. 274, §§ 2, 3; Wis. STAT. (1935) §§ 353-05, 353.06.
3io. The word "almost" is required by the inference in State v. Graham, 19o La.
669, 182 So. 711 (1938), although the accessory there was after the fact.
311. In Florida the accessory after the fact cannot be convicted prior to the con-
viction of the principal. Hysler v. State, 136 Fla. 563, 187 So. 261 (1939).
312. State v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284, 28 S. E. 937 (1897) ; Carlisle v. State, 31 Tex.
Cr. R- 537, 21 S. W. 358 (1893).
The "antiquated rule" that one who, while out of the state, commits a felony within
the state by the aid of a guilty agent, cannot be prosecuted for the crime where it was
committed is no part of Kansas jurisprudence.. State v. Wolkow, 1IO Kan. 722, 202
Pac. 639 (1922).
313. In re Rowe, 77 Fed. 161 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896) ; Hunter v. State, 47 Ariz. 244,
55 P. (2d) 310 (z936); Bums v. State, 197 Ark. 918, 125 S. W. (2d) 463 (939);Miller v. People, 98 Colo. 249, 55 P. (2d) 320 (1936); Workman v. State, 23 N. E.
(2d) 419 (Ind. 1939) ; State v. Patterson, 52 Kan. 335, 34 Pac. 784 (1893); State v.
Whitman, 103 Minn. 92, 114 N. W. 363 (19o8) ; Alexander v. State, 66 Okla. Cr. R. 5,
89 P. (2d) 332 (1939).
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not been convicted,3 14 or even after the principal has been acquitted; 3:-
and that the accessory may be convicted of either a higher 316 or a
lower 317 grade of crime than the principal.
A consideration of the principles underlying the results sought by
legislation in this field is entitled to special attention. "The reason of
this rule is very plain," it was said at one time in support of the com-
mon law position. "If there is no principal, there can be no accessory;
and the law presumes no one guilty until conviction." 318 But, how-
ever "plain" this explanation may be, it lends no support to the conclu-
sions reached. Had such support not been entirely wanting, the acces-
sory concept would not have been excluded in cases of treason and
misdemeanor.
Let a simple factual situation be assumed. Suppose there is abun-
dant evidence to prove that A procured poison and handed it to B with
instructions to B to administer it to C, that B did so with fatal results,
and that A was prompted by a malicious purpose to cause the death of
C. Let it further be supposed that there is substantial doubt whether
B knew he was administering poison or had been led to believe it was a
beneficial drug. Unless this doubt can be clarified it will be impossible
to convict B of murder, but why should this doubt acquit the originator
of this murderous scheme, as to whom there is no doubt? 819 "There
can be no accessory without a guilty principal" 320 it is true, but if B
is a guilty party A is an accessory, and if B is an innocent party A is
a principal in the first degree. Since the punishment is the same in
either case, it is not indispensable, as a matter of criminal justice, that
we should know which label is appropriate in this case.
3 2 '
314. Howard v. People, 97 Colo. 550, 51 P. (2d) 594 (1935) ; Duke v. State, 137
Fla. 513, 188 So. 124 (1939); State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84 (1848) ; State v. Bryson, 173
N. C. 803, 92 S. E. 698 (1917) ; Commonwealth v. Wiswisser, 124 Pa. Super. 251, 188
Atl. 6o4 (1936) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, ig N. E. (2d) 62 (Mass. 1939).
35. Rooney v. United States, 203 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913) ; People v. Bearss,
Io Cal. 68 (1858) ; State v. Bogue, 52 Kan. 79, 34 Pac. 410 (1893) ; Commonwealth
v. Long, 246 Ky. 8og, 56 S. W. (2d) 524 (1933); Cummings v. Commonwealth, 221
Ky. 3Ol, 298 S. W. 943 (1927) ; People v. Smith, 271 Mich. 553, 26o N. W. 911 (1935) ;
Thomas v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. R. 204, 267 Pac. 1040 (1928); State v. Nickolich, 137
Wash. 62, 241 Pac. 664 (1925); State v. Hess, 233 Wis. 4, 288 N. W. 275 (1939);
see State v. Bachelor, 291 N. W. 738 (S. D. 194o).
316. State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 6o N. W. 11g (1894) ; State v. Patterson, 52 Kan.
335, 34 Pac. 784 (1893) ; Fleming v. State, 142 Miss. 872, 1O8 So. 143 (1926) ; Moore
v. Lowe, 116 W. Va. 165, ISo S. E. I (1935).
317. Thomas v. State, 73 Fla. 115, 74 So. I (1917).
318. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 422, 425 (1820).
319. In explanation of the origin of the rule it has been said: "The modes by which
guilt and innocence were proved were, or had lately been, sacral and supernatural proc-
esses which could not be allowed a chance of producing self-contradictory results.
What should we think of the God who suffered the principal to come clean from the
ordeal after the accessory had blistered his hand?" 2 POLLOCKc AND MAITLAND, His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 50g.
32o. People v. Walker, 361 Ill. 482, 488, 198 N. E. 353, 356 (935).
321. Gambrel v. Commonwealth, 283 Ky. 816, 143 S. W. (2d) 514 (194o).
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It has been said that even under modern statutes it is imperative
for the state to prove the guilt of the principal as well as the instiga-
tion by the accessory.322  Thus, it is said, one cannot be convicted for
inciting or abetting a homicide where the person actually committing
the act was justified in doing so,3 23 as where one encourages another to
use deadly force in self-defense.3 24  With proper limitations this posi-
tion may be accepted. If an innocent citizen is the subject of a mur-
derous assault under such circumstances that he is privileged by law to
defend himself by the use of deadly force, a bystander, who could not
himself prevent the harm by milder measures, would incur no guilt by
encouraging the one assailed to shoot in self-defense. But if there
was no actual impending danger, although there appeared to be, the
circumstances might well be such as to entitle the actual slayer to an
excuse based upon a reasonable mistake of fact as to the necessity of
using deadly force in self-defense,3 25 whereas one who counseled him
to take this extreme measure might be found to have made no mistake
but to have spoken with the deliberate and malicious purpose of caus-
ing the death of one known to him to be acting in the capacity of a
"practical" joker. If so, the instigator should be convicted of murder,
as a principal in the first degree if the common law label must be
retained.
If there is no evidence of defendant's guilt except on the theory
that he caused a crime to be committed by another (whether by incite-
ment or abetment), it will obviously be necessary for the prosecution
to prove the crime was actually committed by another,320 and this must
be established with the same certainty as if the perpetrator himself
were on trial.3 27  Aside from outworn technicality, however, it is not
necessary to have a judgment of conviction against the perpetrator to
establish his actual guilt. In fact if such a judgment is available and
is introduced in evidence against the accessory it is not conclusive in
his case but is only prima facie evidence of the other's guilt.3 28 The
322. Ogden v. State, 12 Wis. 532 (i86o) ; accord, Miller v. People, 98 Colo. 249,
55 P. (2d) 320 (1936) ; Thomas v. State, 73 Fla. 11s, 74 So. 1 (1917).
323. Harper v. State, 83 Miss. 402, 35 So. 572 (903) ; Pallon v. State, 62 Tex.
Cr. R. 7i, 136 S. W. 459 (191).
324. Hurd v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 315, 78 S. W. (2d) 9 (ig35). See also,
Chittenden v. Commonwealth, io Ky. L. Rep. 330, 9 S. W. 386 (1888).
325. Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837 (i8gi) ; State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767,
37 Pac. 174 (1894) ; State v. Gray, 43 Ore. 446, 74 Pac. 927 (904).
326. State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 730, 25 So. 372 (899).
327. Aston v. State, x36 Tex. Cr. R. 12, 122 S. W. (2d) 1o73 (1939).
328. Terry v. State, 149 Ark. 462, 233 S. W. 673 (1921); McCall v. State, i2o Fla.
707, 163 So. 38 (935) ; Anderson v. State, 63 Ga. 675 (1878). A statute providing
that a judgment of conviction of the thief "shall be conclusive evidence against said
receiver, that the property of the United States thereon described had been embezzled,
stolen or purloined," was held unconstitutional. Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47
(3,8w).
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accessory may contest this and introduce evidence to show the perpe-
trator really innocent in spite of his conviction.' 29
If criminal courts operated on a purely sporting theory of justice,
and if there were added to this the assumption that the perpetrator
always has greater moral guilt than the inciter, it might seem improper
to convict the latter of a higher grade of crime than the former, or to
punish the inciter after the perpetrator has been acquitted. But any
such assumption is fallacious. While it is true, to take a test from the
homicide cases, that one may incite in the heat of passion what another
carries out in cold blood,330 it is also true that one, acting with malicious
premeditation, may instigate that which is perpetrated by another at
once and in the heat of passion.331 Furthermore, "different juries may
reach different conclusions as to the guilt of the principal",3 3 2 and
through "failure of proof or caprice of the jury the principal may have
been convicted of an offense of lower grade or even acquitted, but this
alone does not determine the question of the guilt or innocence of the
accessory of the crime charged. The actual guilt or innocence of the
principal is the controlling fact, and, having determined that the prin-
cipal is actually guilty of the crime charged, the accessory may be con-
victed and punished as a principal upon proof that he aided, abetted,
and encouraged the commission of the crime." 33
Suppose, for example, the trial of the actual slayer resulted in an
acquittal because the jury was not satisfied with the evidence then
available, but in following up leads from the evidence introduced in
that trial the state has now the most convincing evidence that another
man planned that homicide and hired the one first tried to do the deed.
Certainly the interests of social discipline do- not require that the "man
higher up" should go free merely because his "tool" happened to be
acquitted.
33 4
329. Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 298 Mass. 562, 11 N. E. (2d) 799 (1937) ; State
v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284, 28 S. E. 937 (1897) ; Aston v. State, 136 Tex. Cr. IL 12, 122
S. W. (2d) 1073 (I939). A confession by the principal does not prove his guilt in a
prosecution against the accessory because it is only hearsay as to him. Ogden v. State,
12 Wis. 532 (i86o). The husband of the victim was convicted of rape as principal in
the second degree after the alleged principal in the first degree had been acquitted. The
judgment was reversed and the husband discharged. State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731,
25 So. 372 (I899).
330. State v. Smith, ioo Iowa I, 69 N. W. 269 (1896); Moore v. Lowe, 116 W.
Va. 165, iSo S. E. i (1935).
331. Bingham v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 688, 210S . W. 459 (igg). The de-
fendant was an abettor (present) in this case rather than an inciter, but the basic
problem is the same.
332. Cummings v. Commonwealth, 22I Ky. 3o, 313, 298 S. W. 943, 948 (I927);
cf. Seiden v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; see, Roberts v. People,
303 Colo. 25o, 87 P. (2d) 251 (938) ; Woody v. State, io Okla. Cr. R. 32z, 136 Pac.
430 (93).
333. Fleming v. State, 142 Miss. 872, 88o-1, Io8 So. 143, 145 (1926).
334. "We think a guilty accessory may be punished, even though the principal
escape." State v. Bogue, 52 Kan. 79, 87, 34 Pac. 410, 432 (893).
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The only sound basis for procedure in such cases is that the guilt
of an inciter "must be determined upon the facts which show the part
he had" '3: in the offense, and not upon the result of the trial of some
other person. Needless to say, substantial rights, as distinguished from
technicalities of purely historical significance, should be safeguarded.
336
But every effort should be made to avoid such positions as that mis-
carriage of justice in the trial of the perpetrator must of necessity cause
justice to miscarry when the inciter is tried, or that a defendant must
be acquitted if there is doubt as to which of two theories of the crime
is the true one, if he would be equally guilty of the same offense under
either, 3 37 just as we avoid any notion that the state is estopped to try
and convict the real murderer merely because it has erroneously con-
victed the wrong man in a previous trial.
338
One of the greatest social menaces of the present day is the man
who would be termed an accessory before the fact by the common law
but in lay language is referred to as the "brains" of a crime ring. He
tends to put crime on a "business basis", he recruits members of the
"profession", he provides the means by which crimes are perpetrated on
an elaborate scale, and weapons so that death will result from any inter-
ference with his plans. The guilt of his terrified underlings, who carry
out his commands because they dare not disobey, is certainly no greater
than his. And it will not promote the general scheme of social disci-
pline to handicap the prosecution of such an offender by unreasonable
obstacles.
The position of the accessory after the fact has also been modified
by statute in most of the jurisdictions. These enactments also are
variously worded in the different states. The distinction between the
principal and the accessory after the fact has been quite generally pre-
served,33 9 but there has been a very definite trend in the direction of
removing procedural technicalities from this branch of the law. Cer-
tain other important changes are to be found. The present state of the
statutory law, however, requires these changes, and the details of the
trend mentioned, to be spoken of as accomplishments in some states,
rather than in more general terms.
Some of these enactments, for example, provide that the accessory
after the fact may be tried in any court which shall have jurisdiction of
335. State v. Smith, ioo Iowa I, 4, 69 N. W. 269 (1896).
336. People v. Singh, ii Cal. App. (2d) 244, 53 P. (2d) 403 (1936) ; Warren v.
Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 46o, i S. W. (2d) 774 (1927).
337. The accused was properly convicted although it cannot be determined whether
he fired the fatal shot himself or aided and abetted another in doing so. Gambrel v.
Commonwealth, 283 Ky. 816, 143 S. W. (2d) 514 (940).
338. State v. Couch, 341 Mo. 1239, 1I1 S. W. (2d) 147 (937).
339. "These several distinctions have been abolished by statute in this Territory,
except as to accessories after the fact." Drury v. State, 9 Okla. 398, 403, 60 Pac. IO,
105 (1900). Italics added. See also the statutes cited in the following footnotes.
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the principal felon even if the act of accessoryship was committed out-
side of the state,340 adding, sometimes, that if both events occur within
the state, but in different counties, the accessory may be tried in either
one. 341  Some authorize the trial, conviction and punishment of such
an accessory even if the principal "cannot be taken so as to be prose-
cuted and punished," 342 or "whether his principal has or has not been
convicted," 343 or has been pardoned,3 44 or is dead,345 or has been
acquitted.3 46 On the other hand, the common law requirement that the
accessory after the fact must be charged as such in the indictment has
commonly been retained.347  Hence, one cannot be convicted as such
accessory under an indictment charging him as principal, nor be con-
victed as principal if he is charged as an accessory after the fact. This
seems to be more than a mere technicality, as far as an accessory of this
type is concerned.
The social problem presented by the accessory after the fact is
substantially different from that which arises in connection with the
dccessory before. The accessory after the fact has had no part in caus-
ing the felony itself, but has merely interfered with the due course of
justice. This culpable interference is in itself a socially harmful occur-
rence, and hence may properly be dealt with rather severly in the gen-
eral scheme of social discipline. But the ancient notion that the acces-
sory after the fact has become tainted with the principal felony and
has subjected himself to the same punishment as is provided for the
felon he aided, seems out of line with the general view of the present
day. In fact, as previously mentioned, the movement to moderate the
penalty provided for such misconduct began at an early time in the form
34o. See, e. g., N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 4177.
341. See, e. g., ME. REv. STAT. (1930) C. 143, §7; 9 MASs. LAWS ANN. (1933) C.
274, § 5; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9919; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 4766;
WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 2262.
342. GA. CODE (1933) § 26-606. See also FLA. ComP. GEN. LAWs ANN. (Skill-
man, 1927) § 7123; 9 MASs. LAws ANN. (1933) C. 274, § 5; MINN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 99g9; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 4177; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 193o)
§ 4766; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 226z. A phrase frequently used
in these statutes is in terms of whether the principal "is or is not amenable to justice".
343. ME. REV. STAT. (1930) C. 143, § 8. See also IND. STAT (Bums, 1933) § 9-104;
Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 1129; Mo. STAT. (Permanent ed. 1932) § 4448. And see
the statutes of the following states cited note 342 supra: Fla., Mass., Minn., N. C., Va.
344. See, e. g., GA. CODE (I933) C. 26, § 6o6.
345. See, e. g., ALA. GE . AcTs 1928, § 3197. This would be included under the
more general provisions of a principal who "cannot be taken" or "is not amenable to
justice." See note 91 supra.
346. This is sometimes expressly provided in the statute. See, e. g., MONT. REV.
CODE (I935) § 11865; 1 OKLA. STAT. (1931) §2903. It is sometimes held to be im-
plied in some other phrase, such as, "though the principals be not taken or tried." Com-
monwealth v. Long, 246 Ky. 8og, 56 S. W. (2d) 524 (I933).
347. This is sometimes expressly provided. See, e. g., IND. STAT. ANN. (Bald-
win, 1934) § 2245. More commonly it results from the fact that the statutes preserve
the distinction between the principal and the accessory after the fact and do not include
any change in this part of the rule, while making modifications in other respects. See
the statutes cited in the other footnotes to this paragraph.
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of according benefit of clergy to the accessory after the fact even in
cases in which this privilege was denied to the principal or the acces-
sory before. When benefit of clergy became obsolete,348 the accessory
after the fact was once more subject to the same punishment as the
principal except where a different penalty has been provided by legisla-
tion. Modern statutes vary widely in this respect. Under some, the
accessory after the fact receives the same punishment as the principal,
either by express provision 349 or by the failure to provide any other
penalty.350 Under others, quite a different penalty is provided, such as
"imprisonment for not more than five years, or . . a fine of not
more than five hundred dollars, or by both." 3 51 There may be an
even milder provision than this, as, for example, that one convicted
as accessory after the fact "must be fined not more than one thousand
dollars, and may also be imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to
hard labor for the county, for not more than six months." 352
Some statutes, furthermore, have made a more realistic approach
than did the ancient law, to the part of this problem affected by intimate
relationship between the felon and one who conceals or otherwise aids
him to protect him from the consequences of his crime. The common
law was "so strict . . that the nearest relations are not suffered to
aid or receive one another" 353 in the effort to save a felon from trial
and punishment; and were punishable as accessories after the fact if
they did so. The only exception to this, made nominally at least on
purely technical grounds, 54 was that a wife could not become an acces-
sory after the fact by receiving and concealing or otherwise aiding her
husband. 355 No such protection was accorded the husband who know-
ingly tried to save his wife from the consequences of her felony,356
nor was it recognized in favor of the parent, child or brother of the
principal felon.3 57  In view of the moral timbre of our time, however,
even if it be viewed as weakness, it is asking too much of a jury to
expect a conviction of one who has merely opened his door or given
348. It was abolished in England in 1827. 1 STEPHEN, HiSTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND (1883) 472. In one manner or another it has beeen eliminated in this coun-
try. See I STAT. 114, § 30 (r790), I8 U. S. C. A. § 551 (1927), which excludes it as far
as federal offenses are concerned. "In this country, although in some states recognized
as a part of the common law, it has now universally been abolished either by express
enactment or by implication." 3 WHARTON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (ioth ed., Kerr,
i918) § 1892.
349. See, e. g., IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 2245.
350. See, e. g., IOWA CODE (I935) § 12896.
351. N. Y. CoNs. Lxws (Cahill, 193o) c. 41, § 1934; cf. KAN. Ray. STAT. (1923)
C. 21, § io6; Mo. R a. STAT. (1929) § 4447.
352. ALA. GEN. AcTs (1928) § 5197; cf. GA. CODE (933) C. 26, §4601.
353. 4 BL. Comm. *38.
354.... for she is presumed to act under his coercion ... " Id. at *39.
355. 1 HALE P. C. *629; cf. United States v. Oley, 21 F. Supp. 281 (E. D. N. Y.
1937).
356. 1 HALE P. C. *629.
357. 4 BL. Comm. *38.
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some similar aid to a parent, child or other intimate relation. 358 Hence,
a number of the statutes exclude from the field of accessoryship after
the. fact, any person "standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent
or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity
or affinity" to the principal felon,359 with a qualification sometimes
added, such as, "unless in doing so he shall forcibly break a prison in
which such felon was at the time confined, or take him by force from
an officer or guard." 360
The ends of social discipline will be best served by abrogating
entirely the distinction between the accessory before the fact and the
principal, by removing procedural technicalities from the prosecution
and conviction of the accessory after the fact, by providing milder
penalties for such a party, and by excluding from this type of accessory-
ship those who are intimately related to the principal.
358. Even the court may be influenced by too harsh a rule. In one case a convic-
tion of the felon's brother as accessory was reversed, although the guilt seems to have
been clearly proved. Neal v. United States, IO2 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
359. 4 FLA. ComP. GEN. LAws ANN. (Slillman, 1928) §71i2; INDx. STAT. ANN.
(Baldwin, I934) § 2245; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § i129; Mo. REV. STAT. (1929)
§ 4447; VA. CODE I93o) § 4765; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, r932) § 226 1. Some
statutes have a similar provision without including the grandparent-grandchild relation.
ILT. R v. STAT. (Cahill & Moore, 1935) c. 38, § 584; TENN. CODE (1932) § 10766.
36o. See, e. g., Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) § 1129; ". . . except for resisting, by
force or menaces, officers or others in the legal discharge of their duty, ... " TENN.
CODE (1932) § 10766.
